3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
the “risks
Saddam took in providing a weak declaration of Iraq’s
WMD‑holdings”.
•
There was
“no
sign” that Saddam
Hussein was “unstable or
losing the capacity
to make
rational tactical decisions”. He might
“well
believe” that he had
“some
strong cards
left to play”.
•
Saddam Hussein
was “already placing military targets in residential areas to
score
a
propaganda victory in the event of a Coalition air
campaign”.
•
“In the face
of an attack, or even before hostilities if he judged that an
attack was
imminent,”
Saddam Hussein might take a number of actions,
including:
– making a
last‑minute declaration of his WMD;
– taking
hostages or exploiting “foreign volunteers from countries such as
UK
and France
as human shields”;
– moving
“against the KAZ [Kurdish Autonomous Zone] to provoke
a
humanitarian
crisis and to provide a military distraction”;
– mounting
a pre‑emptive attack against Israel to “provoke a wider
regional
crisis and
rouse the Arab street”; and
–
inflicting “high enough casualties on any Coalition ground forces,
perhaps in
Kuwait,
including through use of CBW, to halt a Coalition attack and to
swing
public
opinion in the West against hostilities”.
•
“Once
hostilities were underway”, Saddam might also:
– “seek to
cause an international outcry over the level of Iraqi or
Coalition
casualties”;
and
– “pursue a
scorched earth policy, including the destruction of oil wells
and
poisoning
the water supply”.
The JIC had
judged in December 2002 that Saddam Hussein “would initially
seek
international
pressure to halt Coalition action”. If that failed, he “would seek
to inflict
serious
casualties on Iraq’s neighbours and on Coalition Forces, in order
to undermine the
Coalition’s
will to fight on”.
In its
Assessment of 29 January, the JIC judged that Saddam Hussein still
believed he had
“a chance
of averting military action or, once military action begins,
forcing the Coalition to
cease
hostilities before his regime collapses”.
812.
Mr Scarlett
assured Sir David Manning on 30 January that the
intelligence
reporting
was “consistent and convincing”, and there was no evidence
that
Saddam
Hussein was considering the renunciation of WMD.
813.
In addition to
the JIC Assessment of 29 January, Mr Scarlett sent
Sir David
Manning his
“personal observations on the overall intelligence
picture”.267
Mr Scarlett
wrote: “Our
intelligence reporting has been consistent and convincing. I have
not seen
a single
reference to Saddam even considering the renunciation of WMD to
save his
regime (and
probably his own life).”
267
Minute
Scarlett to Manning, 30 January 2003, ‘Iraq: JIC Assessment and
Personal Observations’.
149