4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
360.
The brief
stated that the Government assessment published on 24
September
(the dossier),
judged that Iraq:
•
Had “a
usable chemical and biological capability, which included
production in
2002 of
chemical and biological agents, and military plans to use
them”.
•
Continued
“to work on developing nuclear weapons”.
•
Possessed
“up to 20 650km range” Al Hussein missiles”, and was
“developing
longer-range
ballistic missiles, and is extending the ranges of Al Samoud
and
Ababil-100
systems beyond the permitted range of 150km”.
361.
Addressing the
current assessment of Iraq’s capabilities, the brief
stated:
•
There was
“Very little significant new intelligence on [Iraq’s] WMD
capabilities”
since
September 2002, “although continue to see planning for its
use”.
•
The focus
on UN inspections “may have limited activity in some areas such
as
missile
development”.
•
The
“possibility of ongoing production” of CBW agents could not be
ruled out
because it
was “easily concealed especially in the case of BW agents
using
transportable
biological production facilities”.
•
Intelligence
indicated that Iraq had “produced both chemical and
biological
agents
since 1998 to add to stocks since the [1991] Gulf War. As late
as
September
2002 Iraq was carrying out illegitimate work on anthrax that could
be
used as
part of a weapons programme.”
362.
The brief
recognised that not all the systems which were capable of
delivering
chemical
and biological weapons would have such munitions or a CBW delivery
role.
Intelligence
suggested that Iraq might “not be able to deliver CBW efficiently”
using
Al Samoud
and Ababil-100 missiles.
363.
Addressing
Iraq’s declaration in response to resolution 1441, the brief
rehearsed
the
outstanding issues identified by UNSCOM in 1999 and added
references to Iraq’s:
•
understatement
in the declaration of the quantity of Volga engines which
had
been
procured;
•
lack of any
reference to the engine test stand at al-Rafah; and
•
“misrepresentation
of the status and performance of the L-29 programme”.
364.
Addressing
Iraq’s concealment and deception activities, the briefing for
the
Cabinet
stated that “Iraq was confident in its ability to prevent
inspectors finding
any ‘smoking gun’”.
365.
The briefing
for Mr Anderson and Mr George had stated that “Iraq was
confident
that
inspections would not find” any “smoking gun”.
357