The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Basra proposed a new structure, with a civilian lead, to co‑ordinate the UK’s effort in

the South.

104. Reports from Basra after March 2007 indicate that civilian‑military co‑ordination

improved.

105. Co‑ordination on the ground was complicated by:

• the lack of an integrated UK strategy (within which civilian and military teams on

the ground could locate their efforts); and

• the physical separation of the UK’s civilian and military teams until February

2007 – the effect of that separation was exacerbated by the constraints on travel

in Basra and the lack of a common communications system.

106. The Government should have acted much sooner to support civilian‑military

co‑ordination on the ground in Iraq.

107. Section 9.8 concludes that the Government’s frequent new strategies for Iraq did

not result in substantial changes in direction, due to their focus on describing a desired

end state (rather than on how it would be reached), the absence of a Cabinet Minister

with overall responsibility for Iraq, and the difficulty in translating Government strategy

into action by departments. Although Iraq was designated the UK’s highest foreign policy

priority, it was not the top priority within individual departments.

108. Throughout the period, reconstruction was presented as the third pillar of UK

strategy, after the political process and security. None of the UK’s strategies defined

how reconstruction related to the political process and security, how progress on

reconstruction could contribute to achieving broader UK objectives and, in that context,

whether the focus and scale of the UK’s reconstruction effort was appropriate.

Only once during the period covered by the Inquiry were Ministers invited to consider

fundamental questions on the size, focus and impact of the UK’s reconstruction effort and

the contribution that reconstruction could make to achieving broader UK objectives.

The Ministerial Committee on Defence and Overseas Policy on Iraq (DOP(I)), chaired by

Mr Blair, met for the first time on 26 May 2005.35 The Annotated Agenda for the meeting,

prepared by the Cabinet Office, invited Ministers to consider a number of questions,

including:

• Was the funding available for reconstruction across Government adequate?

• Was the UK investing at a level that supported its objective of creating stability such

that there could be troop withdrawals?

35 Annotated Agenda, 24 May 2005, DOP(I) meeting.

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