The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
452.
Finally, Mr
Hoon proposed that Mr Blair might raise with Present Bush “the need
for
a
comprehensive public handling strategy, so that we can explain
convincingly why we
need to
take such drastic action against Iraq’s WMD now”.
453.
Copies of Mr
Hoon’s letter were sent to Mr Straw and to Sir Richard
Wilson.
454.
Mr Straw
wrote to Mr Blair on 25 March setting out the risks which
could
arise from
discussions with President Bush, but suggesting the “case
against
Iraq and in
favour (if necessary) of military action” might be made in the
context
of seeking
regime change as an essential part of a strategy of eliminating
Iraq’s
WMD, rather
than an objective in its own right.
455.
Mr Straw
advised that the fact that Iraq was in flagrant breach of
the
obligations
imposed on it by the Security Council provided the core of a
strategy
based on
international law.
456.
The case
could be based on a demand for the unfettered re-admission
of
inspectors.
457.
The US was
likely to oppose any proposal for a new mandate from the
UN
Security
Council, but the weight of UK legal advice was that a new mandate
“may
well be
required”.
458.
Mr Straw
also stated that, if the argument was to be won, the whole
“case
against
Iraq and in favour (if necessary) of military action” needed to be
narrated
with
reference to the international rule of law.
459.
In his meeting
on 18 March, Mr Straw asked for “detailed advice from FCO
Legal
Advisers on
the provisions in international law for the use of the kind of
force that might
be required
should the Americans set themselves the objective of regime
change”.162
460.
Mr Straw
concluded he would write to the Prime Minister to flag up the
main
issues for
Crawford, including a media strategy, and asked for a draft,
submitted through
Sir Michael
Jay.
461.
Mr John
Grainger, FCO Legal Counsellor in the Middle East Department,
advised
on 21 March
that any action by HMG to assist any group to overthrow the
regime
in Iraq by
violent means would be contrary to international law; and that any
use of
force with
the objective of changing the Iraqi regime would be
unlawful.163
But
regime
change
would not be unlawful if it was a consequence of the use of force
permitted
by international
law.
162
Minute
Sedwill to Patey, 18 March 2002, ‘Iraq’.
163
Minute
Grainger to PS [FCO], 21 March 2002, ‘Iraq: Regime
Change’.
468