11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
192.
Mr Straw
enclosed with his letter a paper produced by the FCO Research
Analysts
which set
out the substantive issues that the Iraqi Constitution needed to
address,
including:
•
language on
how the Constitution could be amended; this was
particularly
important
given concern among Sunni Arabs that they had not had
sufficient
involvement
in the development of the Constitution; and
•
de‑Ba’athification
– in the interests of national unity, the UK wanted to
ensure
these
provisions did not become “more draconian” than the existing
provisions
in the
Transitional Administrative Law.
“Substantive
moves towards a ‘truth and reconciliation process’ or
further
amendments
to the policy of de‑Ba’athification should be dealt with outside
the
Constitution.”
194.
Under the
heading “The detail”, FCO Research Analysts explained that
the
Transitional
Administrative Law said that no candidate for the Transitional
National
Assembly
should have been a Division member of the Ba’ath Party, unless they
had
been given
specific exemption to stand. They must not have participated in
persecution.
Members of
the Presidency Council must also have left the Ba’ath Party at
least
10 years
before the fall of Saddam Hussein.
195.
Adherence to
these criteria by the main Shia and Kurdish political blocs had
meant
rejection
of several Sunni Arabs for positions, which has “caused some
resentment”.
196.
On 12 July,
Mr William Patey, successor to Mr Chaplin as British
Ambassador to
Iraq,
reported that Grand Ayatollah al‑Sistani162
had told
the UN Special Representative
to Iraq
that “it would be important to maximise Sunni inclusion. The only
people who
should be
excluded were criminals and former members of the
regime.”163
197.
In mid‑July
the JIC assessed the state of the insurgency in Iraq, at the
request of
the Cabinet
Office.164
It judged
that the bulk of Iraqi insurgents were Sunni Arabs but
did
not see
evidence of a unified or national command structure:
“The Iraqi
Sunni Arab insurgency remains characterised by disparate groups,
some
based on
family, tribal and religious links. Many have former regime
connections,
and
military expertise is widely exploited. But we judge the influence
of recalcitrant
Ba’athists,
including the Ba’ath Party’s military wing, Jaysh
Muhammad,
to be
marginal.”
162
Iraq’s most
senior Shia theologian.
163
eGram
8781/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 July 2005, ‘Iraq: UNSRSG meets
Sistani and
Muqtada al Sadr’.
164
JIC
Assessment, 14 July 2005, ‘Iraq: State of the
Insurgency’.
39