9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
all they
have to do is wait us out. We will stay in Iraq as long as we are
needed, and
not a day
longer.”
55.
The Chiefs of
Staff considered ACM Torpy’s paper ‘Operational Transition in Iraq’
on
29
June.21
They were
broadly content with the paper, though noted that
consideration
would need
to be given to sustaining Iraqi capacity building during the
drawdown phase,
including
the work that other government departments (primarily the FCO and
DFID)
were doing
in Iraq.
56.
The Chiefs
considered that:
“The UK was
in a good position to force the pace of drawdown in the
comparatively
benign
MND(SE), but it was essential that this did not create a perception
of
break‑up
within the coalition, or undermine UK/US relations, particularly as
early
transition
would be possible in all areas except those in which the US
were
operating,
since they tended to be the more difficult … The UK plan needed
to
be
presented as the lead element of the overall Transition plan from
Iraq;
the US
position was likely to be that no exit strategy was planned for
Iraq as a
whole, but
rather that a gradual drawdown from parts of Iraq would occur
on
a
conditional basis.”
57.
On 29 June, at
the request of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence
Secretariat,
the JIC
looked specifically at the role of Islamist jihadists in
Iraq.22
58.
The JIC judged
that jihad in Iraq was “getting worse” and that the MNF were not
yet
degrading
the jihadists’ campaign:
“Islamist
jihadists represent a small but growing proportion of the
insurgency. Their
suicide
bombing campaign is intensifying and having disproportionate impact
on the
security
situation … This has affected international public opinion and
damaged the
credibility
and confidence of the Iraqi Transitional Government …
“Most
suicide bombers are foreigners, but the Iraqi component of the
jihad is
increasing.
The jihadists’ extreme methods remain repellent to most
Sunnis.
But a
combination of their successful attacks, anti-coalition/American
stance and
opposition
to a perceived Shia and Iranian dominated government is attracting
more
support and
enabling greater co-operation with some Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgents
…
“The
viability of the jihadist campaign will only come under threat if
the wider Sunni
insurgency
diminishes and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs are prepared, and able, to
reject
the foreign
jihadists in their midst.”
21
Minutes, 29
June 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
22
JIC
Assessment, 29 June 2005, ‘The Islamist Jihad in Iraq: Getting
Worse’.
497