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9.4  |  June 2005 to May 2006
all they have to do is wait us out. We will stay in Iraq as long as we are needed, and
not a day longer.”
55.  The Chiefs of Staff considered ACM Torpy’s paper ‘Operational Transition in Iraq’ on
29 June.21 They were broadly content with the paper, though noted that consideration
would need to be given to sustaining Iraqi capacity building during the drawdown phase,
including the work that other government departments (primarily the FCO and DFID)
were doing in Iraq.
56.  The Chiefs considered that:
“The UK was in a good position to force the pace of drawdown in the comparatively
benign MND(SE), but it was essential that this did not create a perception of
break‑up within the coalition, or undermine UK/US relations, particularly as early
transition would be possible in all areas except those in which the US were
operating, since they tended to be the more difficult … The UK plan needed to
be presented as the lead element of the overall Transition plan from Iraq;
the US position was likely to be that no exit strategy was planned for Iraq as a
whole, but rather that a gradual drawdown from parts of Iraq would occur on
a conditional basis.”
57.  On 29 June, at the request of the Cabinet Office Overseas and Defence Secretariat,
the JIC looked specifically at the role of Islamist jihadists in Iraq.22
58.  The JIC judged that jihad in Iraq was “getting worse” and that the MNF were not yet
degrading the jihadists’ campaign:
“Islamist jihadists represent a small but growing proportion of the insurgency. Their
suicide bombing campaign is intensifying and having disproportionate impact on the
security situation … This has affected international public opinion and damaged the
credibility and confidence of the Iraqi Transitional Government …
“Most suicide bombers are foreigners, but the Iraqi component of the jihad is
increasing. The jihadists’ extreme methods remain repellent to most Sunnis.
But a combination of their successful attacks, anti-coalition/American stance and
opposition to a perceived Shia and Iranian dominated government is attracting more
support and enabling greater co-operation with some Iraqi Sunni Arab insurgents …
“The viability of the jihadist campaign will only come under threat if the wider Sunni
insurgency diminishes and the Iraqi Sunni Arabs are prepared, and able, to reject
the foreign jihadists in their midst.”
21  Minutes, 29 June 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
22  JIC Assessment, 29 June 2005, ‘The Islamist Jihad in Iraq: Getting Worse’.
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