The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• He had publicly set out the “Blix-agreed tests” and “also argued that because of

President Chirac’s threat of a veto in any circumstances, it is difficult to see how

the UN can uphold 1441”.

• He planned to put the issue to a vote in Parliament.

327. Mr Rycroft suggested that Mr Blair should ask President Bush for help to win

the vote in Parliament by stating publicly that he would publish the Road Map for the

Middle East and make a commitment to further UN resolutions, establishing a UN role

in reconstruction and humanitarian issues and in running the Oil-for-Food programme

post‑conflict.

328. In the discussion with President Bush, Mr Blair argued that the US and UK should

continue to seek a compromise in the UN and show that they were reasonable by setting

out the tests, but he knew it would not happen.108 Mr Blair would say publicly that the

French had prevented them from securing a resolution, so there would not be one.

329. Mr Blair and President Bush discussed continuing the diplomatic route until

Sunday, 16 March and then closing it down.

330. Mr Blair said he wanted to avoid a gap between the end of the negotiating process

and the House of Commons vote planned for the following week; and to minimise the

risk of an unhelpful French initiative. He would “have to pull out all the stops to win

the vote”.

331. Mr Blair and President Bush also discussed:

• a US ultimatum to Saddam to leave;

• the military timetable;

• the need for a communications strategy with an initiative each day before the

start of military action;

• the need for initiatives on the Road Map; and

• a US statement on the need for a further UN resolution on post-conflict Iraq.

332. Sir David Manning would pursue the details with Dr Rice.

333. Mr Campbell wrote in his diaries:

“Bush said his people had watched TB at PMQs and said he was brilliant. TB said

he had spoken to Lagos and the Chileans … Bush said Fox had told him he would

get back to him within an hour and then went off to hospital … TB laid it on the line

that we had to have a vote in the Commons. He said we couldn’t pull the plug on UN

negotiating because the bigger the gap between the end of the negotiation and the

Commons motion, the worse it was for us. We had to keep trying.

108 Letter Rycroft to McDonald, 12 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Telephone Conversation with

President Bush, 12 March’.

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