10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
628.
The British
Embassy Office Basra offered a similar view:
“We cannot
go into ordinary Iraqi homes, shops and schools or move freely
around
the city
(or even our own compound). Nearly all our local staff have left
because of
death
threats and intimidation.” 361
629.
The accounts
were passed to Mr Blair on 10 November.362
630.
DOP(I)
considered the impact of the withdrawal of civilian personnel
on
16 November.363
Mrs Beckett
and Sir Suma Chakrabarti reported that the impact of
the
withdrawal
of civilian personnel from the BPC on the Better Basra Action Plan
and on
DFID’s
programmes had been “marginal”.
631.
Mrs Beckett
summed up that officials should develop some clear and
agreed
forward
planning on the future of the civilian and military presence in
Basra.
632.
A December
2006 joint DFID/PCRU report assessed that the impact of the
PRT’s
withdrawal
from the BPC to Kuwait on its work was “significant but not
catastrophic”.364
Little of
its work required face-to-face contact with Iraqi
citizens.
633.
The relocation
of the PRT from Kuwait to BAS was under way, and the benefits
of
co-location
with MND(SE) were already apparent. The PRT’s access to military
partners
went some
way to overcoming problems caused by the lack of a common
secure
communication
system between civilians and the military. Informal contacts were
also
helping to
build mutual understanding of objectives and aims.
634.
A number of
witnesses told the Inquiry that the move to BAS led to much
greater
contact
between UK civilian personnel and Iraqi citizens. Mr Robert
Tinline, Deputy
Consul
General in Basra, described BAS as a “neutral venue”:
“Because we
were next to the airport, which was Iraqi obviously, but close
enough
to our
security … that meant they [our Iraqi interlocutors] didn’t have to
come and
see us and
we didn’t have to go and see them. So it was actually very
good.” 365
635.
Section 9.5
describes the wider implications of the withdrawal of civilian
personnel,
including
for US/UK relations.
636.
Mr Gordon
Brown, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, visited Basra
on
18 November.366
During that
visit, Maj Gen Shirreff expressed his concern that
long-term
economic
and development work was being prioritised above short-term
interventions
that would
yield more immediate results. He proposed that the UK should
establish a
361
Letter
Marsden to IPU [junior official], 7 November 2006, ‘Iraq: Basra;
Life for Ordinary Iraqis’.
362
Minute
Banner to Prime Minister, 10 November 2006, ‘Iraq Update: 10
November’.
363
Minutes, 16
November 2006, DOP(I) meeting.
364
Report
PCRU/DFID, 19 December 2006, ‘Refocusing Civilian Efforts in Basra
in the Run Up to PIC’.
365
Public
hearing, 24 June 2010, pages 10-11.
366
Minute
Treasury [junior official] to Chancellor, 13 December 2003, ‘Basra
Visit: Responding to Major
General
Shirreff’s Concerns’.
299