The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

476. There was also a discussion about the role of the UN in a post-Saddam Hussein

administration (see Section 6.5.)

477. When Mr Hoon met Gen Franks, he stated that the UK was keen for a serious

and substantial role for UK forces.

478. Gen Franks told Mr Hoon that it was “not yet necessary to clarify the final

plan”. He “understood the strategic requirement for a UK profile”.

479. The same day, Gen Franks had attended a working breakfast hosted by

Adm Boyce and briefed the Chiefs of Staff.164 Sir David Manning, Sir Richard Dearlove

and Mr Watkins were also present.

480. Mr Watkins sent a record of the meeting to Mr Hoon (who was due to meet

Gen Franks in Qatar on 26 February), stating that Gen Franks had said the US would

“make the call on Turkey tomorrow” and that while the ability to deploy “heavy armour”

from the North would have been helpful, it was not critical.

481. Mr Watkins advised Mr Hoon to press Gen Franks on the precise utilisation of UK

forces in Phase III (the conflict phase of operations): “Politically and constitutionally,

Ministers need to know this and in good time.”

482. Mr Hoon and Air Marshal Brian Burridge, UK National Contingent Commander

(NCC), met Gen Franks in Qatar on 26 February.165

483. The record of the meeting reported that there was a chance to get a northern

option in place through the Parliamentary process in Turkey, but sadly the Parliamentary

debate had been suspended.

484. Gen Franks had said there were now 195,000 US troops in the region and,

when that figure rose to 250,000 in mid-March, he would be ready to support any

“policy decision”.

485. Gen Franks believed that it would “be possible to reach an agreement” on

targeting. He recognised the difficulties associated with dual-use targets but there could

be “serious military consequences” if they shied away from some of the communication

facilities. Mr Hoon explained he would have “no problem clearing the targets where there

was a definite military advantage”.

486. Mr Hoon had noted the “proportionally very significant investment which the UK

had made to the force build up” and “was keen for a serious and substantial role for

British forces”.

164 Minute Watkins to Secretary of State [MOD], 25 February 2003, ‘Meeting with General Franks:

26 February’.

165 Minute Williams to DG Op Pol, 27 February 2003, ‘Secretary of State’s Call on General Franks

(CENTCOM) – 26 February 2003’.

460