9.4 | June 2005 to May 2006

117. On 25 July, the TNA passed a referendum law which defined two conditions that

must be met for a “yes” vote on the new Iraqi Constitution to be valid.56 They were:

“Firstly, there is the positive condition that ‘a majority of the voters in Iraq approve’.

Secondly, there is the negative condition that ‘two-thirds of the voters in three or

more governorates do not reject it.’”

118. Mr Patey reported that debate had broken out over the meaning of the first

condition; did it refer to a majority of those who voted, or of those on the electoral

list? UN elections experts believed the former, as did the drafters. However, Mr Patey

warned:

“If this ‘electoral list’ interpretation prevails, the risk that the Constitution will

be rejected increases. On the basis that those sponsoring this reading will

shortly realise their ploy is fraught with risk, we will seek to support UN efforts

for a clarification in favour of the ‘votes cast’ interpretation by explaining to key

interlocutors the dangers of gambling on a high turnout.”

119. On 25 July, Mr Patey informed the FCO that the first full draft of the Constitution

had been circulated.57

120. The text was “rough” and many issues of substance remained unresolved,

including how the status of Kirkuk would be determined. Mr Patey also recorded

concerns about the qualification of women’s rights by Shar’ia Law, “unnecessary and

unhelpful” references to de-Ba’athification, and about judicial independence.

121. Passing Mr Patey’s telegram to Mr Straw, the IPU reported that a “gathering of

senior Iraqis” was expected to thrash out the issues of substance later in the week.58

There were positive signs of continued commitment to the drafting timetable.

122. The IPU also highlighted that control of natural resources was a key issue in the

debate on federalism in the Constitution. Three options were on the table:

“Two of these stipulate resources will be managed by the federal government, with

a portion allocated to the regions. The third allows the regions to exploit natural

resources under supervision of the federal government.”

123. Mr Blair spoke to President Bush by video conference on 26 July and said that

the US and UK needed to “knit our political and security strategies together”.59 The ITG

needed active support in reaching out to the Sunni community, and the UK and US

should “press hard for a big push”, including with helpful partners in the region.

56 eGram 9728/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Referendum Law Passed’.

57 eGram 9738/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 25 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution Update, 25 July’.

58 Minute Fawcett to Foreign Secretary, 26 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution: Update’.

59 Letter Quarrey to Siddiq, 26 July 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with President Bush: 26 July 2005’.

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