The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
that FRES
“was in danger of falling into the trap of over‑specification …
despite Board
injunctions
to the contrary”.126
The project
would therefore focus on “delivering simpler
variants as
soon as possible … with more complex variants later
on”.
247.
On 25 June,
Maj Gen Richards produced a paper for the Executive
Committee of
the Army
Board (ECAB) on the impact of the DMB’s decisions.127
He wrote
that support
to current
operations “remained the enduring top priority”, but between 2004
and 2008,
the
emphasis should be on developing network‑enabling activity, an
initial air manoeuvre
capability,
“and the development of medium weight forces”.
248.
The “most
painful measure” for the Army as a result of the DMB decisions
was
the effect
on the FRES programme. Maj Gen Richards wrote that delays
in agreeing
the
procurement strategy for the programme meant that the ISD had
slipped from
2009 to
2010. In addition, the measures agreed by DMB as part of the
discussions
about the
Equipment Programme in February, meant that the ISD could be
delayed
further to
2012. As a result, the full operating capability for FRES was
“unlikely” to be
fielded
before 2017. That would mean running on existing armoured vehicles
and could
lead to
additional Short Term Plan or Equipment Programme costs elsewhere
in the
programme.
249.
Addressing
future requirements, the paper stated that the Army’s highest
priority
for the
next 15 years was the development of a rapid intervention
capability “with
capable
medium forces as soon as possible”. Given the delay to FRES, “an
imaginative
and
incremental approach” would be needed. ECAB was asked to agree that
the
priorities
for a medium weight capability were:
•
Between
2005 and 2009:
Development of an initial medium weight capability,
“based on
in‑service equipments, and those about to enter service in the
period”.
•
Between 2010
and 2014: Capable
medium weight forces based on the simple
FRES
variant.
•
Beyond
2014: Fully
capable medium weight forces, including complex FRES
variants.
250.
It was also
clear from the paper that the Army perceived the costs of the
DMB’s
decision to
protect large capital programmes for the Navy and Air Force, in
support
of an
“apparent ambition to deliver a sophisticated capability in every
capability area”,
had been
found from “Land programmes”; and that could lead to further cuts
in future.
126
Minutes, 24
June 2004, Defence Management Board meeting.
127
Paper ACGS,
25 June 2004, ‘Review of the Equipment Programme for the Army 2004
(Repa 04)’.
44