8 | The
invasion
“The
precise tasks that will fall to UK forces in Phase IV remain to be
determined.
These will
depend very largely on the circumstances that obtain at the end of
Phase
III … It is
thus not possible to make a firm determination of the final
geographic
scope of UK
responsibility that will be possible within the upper scale of
effort
approved by
Ministers. For the moment, planning guidance, based on the
‘Ministerial
Guidance’
received refers to a focus in Basra province with extension beyond
that
dependent
on events and Coalition support.”
590.
Conditions for
ORHA’s deployment were “not yet right at many levels”:
•
there was
“no prospect” of an early “fourth” resolution endorsing
arrangements
for
post-conflict Iraq;
•
the US
Department of Defense (DoD) and the State Department had not
agreed
on the
composition of ORHA and the IIA;
•
1 (UK) Div
was the de facto authority in most of South-East Iraq,
albeit
subordinate
to the CFLCC, but the relationship between Maj Gen Brims
and
ORHA was
not clear; and
•
the
pressing tasks were “humanitarian and low-level administration (eg
opening
schools and
hospitals)”; ORHA’s political baggage might be
“counterproductive
to our
efforts to win the confidence of local people”.
591.
Mr Lee
recommended that, in the light of indications that ORHA might soon
move
to “an
operational and public posture that the UK would find unhelpful”,
Mr Hoon should
telephone
Secretary Rumsfeld to suggest a pragmatic approach to ORHA’s
rapidly
developing
plan to deploy into southern Iraq.
592.
The attached
speaking notes for Mr Hoon were listed “in increasing order
of
candour”.
They included:
“– Struck
by the success of ‘local’ and ‘prototyping’ approach we’ve taken
to
clearing
villages and towns (az-Zubayr) while developing situation in
Basra.
––
Don’t
believe the situation is ready in (our bit of) Iraq for all
dimensions of
ORHA but a
‘toe in the water’ or prototyping with the humanitarian and
initial
reconstruction
elements could be very helpful.
––
End state
we’re looking for is a supportive high consent population so that
we
can
get forces
out and allow Iraqis to run their own affairs; getting the
transitional
arrangements
right is vital for this.
––
President
and Prime Minister agreed to a ‘softly softly’ approach on the
big
political
questions about Phase IV and the form of UN endorsement
and
involvement;
ORHA big bang would run counter to that.
––
Concerned
about how it would relate to (destabilise?) our 1 (UK) Div
effort.
…
––
The Iraqis
are traumatised and the regional neighbours are suspicious
gusting
hostile;
now is not the time to launch something so politically
controversial; let’s
win the war
first.”
105