4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
documents
provided with the Iraqi declaration, of 7 December 2002, required
“in-depth
study”
because they contained “updated relevant information responding to
many
questions”.
Iraq had “the right to wonder whether the declaration had been
studied with
due
diligence and thoroughness”. Iraq had “begun to co-operate
pro-actively”, and many
speakers
had called for that but there was a question about what that would
mean.
330.
Mr Aldouri
pointed out that there was an “Arabic proverb that an empty
hand
has nothing
to give. You cannot give what you do not have. If we do not possess
such
weapons,
how can we disarm ourselves? How can such weapons be dismantled if
they
do not
exist?”
331.
Iraq agreed
that the “best way to resolve these issues is through continuing
pro-
active
co-operation with the inspectors”. Mr Aldouri stressed that
Iraq had:
“… chosen
the path of peace. We have opted for solutions that would satisfy
the
international
community. We are prepared to provide all means to assist in
making
clear the
true picture …
“We hope
the Security Council will heed the desire of the vast majority of
States
Members of
the United Nations and allow the inspectors to fulfil their role
…”
332.
In the
subsequent private discussion of the Council, Mr Straw stated
that
there was
“overwhelming evidence that Iraq had had WMD”; if there was
no
evidence it
had been destroyed, we had to work on the basis that it
existed.
333.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that in response to points raised during the
private
session of
the Council, Mr Straw had stated that the reason the Council
had said Iraq’s
WMD posed a
threat was because there was “overwhelming evidence that it had
had
the
material. If we had no evidence it had been destroyed, we had to
work on the basis
that it
existed and that there was a danger to the region and to our
national security.”125
Oral
cross-examination was the best way to get the truth. Interviewees
were not saying
anything
and were insisting on tape recorders because they wanted to stay
alive: “Until
Iraq
allowed interviews outside Iraq and in free conditions, we would be
naive to think
that they
were co-operating.”
334.
Dr Blix
told Mr Blair on 20 February that the intelligence he had
received was
“not all
that compelling”; perhaps there was not much WMD in
Iraq.
335.
Mr Blair
telephoned Dr Blix on 20 February.126
336.
In the course
of a discussion lasting 45 minutes about the possibility of
devising
an
ultimatum for Iraq and tests for compliance (see Section 3.7), Dr
Blix told Mr Blair
that the
intelligence he had received was “not all that compelling”. While
he still tended
125
Telegram
266 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Blix and
ElBaradei
Presentations:
Private Session’.
126
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 20 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Blix’.
353