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Decision-making within government
who
had visited Iraq and from intelligence.33
The
Research Analysts also acted as the
contact point
within government for the US State Department’s Future of Iraq
project
(see
Section 6.4).
61.
The FCO told
the Inquiry that one analyst worked full-time on Iraq during
2001,
increasing
to two from mid-2002.34
62.
On 29 November
2002, the FCO Board discussed priorities for the coming
months,
including
reviewing Iraq policy and planning:
“The Board
agreed that the possibility of war in Iraq would remain the prime
focus
of
attention over the next months. It discussed contingency plans
being put in place.
Work was in
hand on staffing and establishing emergency units [see Section
6.5].
Procedures
were due to be tested in January … Board members stressed the
need
to keep the
level of threat under review; and to keep examining and testing out
the
63.
On 2 December,
Mr Ricketts (FCO Political Director) sent Sir Michael Jay
(FCO
PUS) advice
on “preparations for handling an all-out Iraq
crisis”.36
Mr Ricketts
explained
that he
held daily meetings at 0900 to co-ordinate FCO activity, chaired in
his absence
by another
FCO Board member or Mr Edward Chaplin (FCO Director, Middle East
and
North
Africa). He also described the Iraq-related responsibilities of FCO
senior officials:
“William
Ehrman [Director General Defence and Intelligence] deals with JIC
and
MOD, Graham
Fry [Director General Wider World] supervises work on
consular
planning …;
Edward Chaplin and Charles Gray take the lead on policy
advice,
working
with DSI for longer range thinking, with the UN and CFSP [Common
Foreign
and
Security Policy] teams, with the Legal Advisers and others. I have
deliberately
involved a
wide spread of senior managers, because we may well have to
sustain
an intense
crisis for a significant period …
“You will
of course want to be closely involved in all the policy-making. One
of the
key tasks
of the Emergency Unit is to prepare the Foreign Secretary and you
for the
[anticipated]
No.10 meetings, to ensure the FCO is pro-active and thinking
ahead.
I propose
to take responsibility under you as overall co-ordinator
…
“MED and
Personnel Command discussed again this week the staff
numbers
required to
produce this structure, and other essential augmentation (for
example,
for the
Press Office and Consular Division) … But it will be vital that the
Board meets
early and
decides which tasks can fall away …
33
Statement
FCO Research Analysts, November 2009, pages 1-2.
34
Email FCO
to Iraq Inquiry, 3 June 2013, ‘FCO Research Analysts’.
35
Minutes, 29
November 2002, FCO Board meeting.
36
Minute
Ricketts to PUS [FCO], 2 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Handling the
Crisis’.
277