9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
consideration
of more radical options, such as an early withdrawal or else a
substantial
increase in
effort. The Inquiry has identified a number of moments, especially
during the
first year
of the Occupation, when it would have been possible to conduct a
substantial
reappraisal.
None took place.
175.
Between May
2003 and May 2007, there were more than 20 instances in which
UK
strategy
and objectives were reconsidered.
176.
It is
important to reassess any strategy in the light of changing
circumstances or
new
information, but that is not the pattern that emerged in relation
to the UK strategy for
Iraq. The
production of strategies consumed considerable time and energy,
particularly
in
government departments, but new strategies did not result in
substantial changes of
direction.
There are a number of reasons why that was the case.
177.
Crucially, UK
strategies tended to focus on describing the desired end state
rather
than how it
would be reached. On none of the 20 occasions when UK strategy
was
reconsidered
was a robust plan for implementation produced. Setting a clear
direction
of travel
is a vital element of an effective strategy, but strategies also
require a serious
assessment
of the material resources available and how they can best be
deployed to
achieve the
desired end state. That is especially important when the strategy
relates to
an armed
conflict in which it will be actively opposed by organised and
capable groups.
There is
very little evidence of thorough analysis of the resources,
expertise, conditions
and support
needed to make implementation of UK strategy
achievable.
178.
Without
properly defined and resourced delivery plans, the UK faced
obvious
difficulties
in converting strategy into action. Consequently, the strategies
that were
developed
had limited longevity and impact.
179.
In the absence
of a Cabinet Minister with overall responsibility for Iraq,
leadership
on strategy
rested with Mr Blair. His judgement regarding the issues
holding back
progress
was often right. For instance, in April 2004 he recognised that the
lack of a
stable and
secure environment was key and wrote to President Bush: “The good
news is
that the
problem we face is not multi-faceted. It is simple: security. The
bad news is that
I am
not sure we yet have a fully worked-out strategy to tackle it. But
we can get one.”58
180.
In the UK
system, however, the Prime Minister does not lead a department of
his
or her own.
Mr Blair’s ability to solve the strategic problems he
identified therefore relied
on his
Cabinet colleagues, and the departments they led, working
together.
58
Letter
Sheinwald to Rice, 26 April 2004, [untitled] attaching
Note [Blair to Bush], [undated], ‘Note’.
501