The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
425.
Mr Brown
said that the UK was not asking for any more troops than he
and
Prime Minister
Maliki had already discussed: 400 troops plus ships. It would be
possible
to discuss
a reduction in troop numbers but the UK could not weaken
jurisdictional
immunities.
426.
Prime Minister
Maliki said that Iraq had three concerns:
•
The number
of locations for troops in Iraq was unspecified.
•
Immunities
were being requested even inside Iraqi installations.
•
Troop tasks
were not limited to training and naval support but also
involved
participation
in command chains.
427.
Prime Minister
Maliki suggested that the British Embassy should
recommence
negotiations
with the Iraqi MOD. Mr Brown said that he hoped that rapid
progress could
be made
during the course of the day and would call again later;
Mr Maliki said that Iraq
could move
quickly but would require the UK to be flexible.
428.
Later that day
Mr Brown’s Assistant Private Secretary reported that there
remained
no
agreement in Baghdad.175
429.
The Assistant
Private Secretary advised that the MOD and the Embassy
wanted
to “throw
in the towel” but Mr McDonald, Mr Cavanagh and he
disagreed and thought
that
agreement could be reached on a new package, for example offering
places at
Sandhurst
plus the naval operation. Mr McDonald would go to Baghdad as
Mr Brown’s
personal
envoy after visiting Washington the following day.
430.
Mr Brown’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Hutton’s Private Secretary on 28
May
to say
that Mr Brown had asked Mr McDonald to visit Baghdad
early the following week
to seek
agreement on a package comprising:
•
an offer to
withdraw the remaining 400 troops, and re-badge UK
training
assistance
under the NATO training mission;
•
enhanced
training opportunities in the UK, including a substantial number
of
officer
training places at Sandhurst; and
•
continuing
with the UK’s naval operations, especially to protect oil
platforms.176
431.
Mr McDonald
told the Inquiry that it had been “quite easy” agreeing with
Prime
Minister
Maliki that Iraq had a training need to give the navy extra
capabilities and the
175
Email
Catsaras to Brown, 26 May 2009, ‘Maliki’.
176
Letter
Catsaras to Ferguson, 28 May 2009, ‘Iraq: Defence
MOU’.
454