10.1 |
Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004
721.
Looking
further ahead, Baroness Amos advised that DFID’s
medium-term
priorities
were “self-evident”: robust macro-economic policy planning and
budget
management;
reform of the public service; encouragement of civil society;
and
facilitation
of private investment. Specific activities would be informed by
sectoral
assessments
being undertaken by the World Bank, the IMF and UN agencies. As
a
leading
member of the Coalition, the UK would be expected to play a
substantial part
in filling
Iraq’s financing gap.
722.
On 16
September, Mr Straw, Mr Hoon and Baroness Amos agreed
that officials
should
review the UK’s approach to planning and preparation for
post-conflict
situations.397
That work
led to the establishment of the Post-Conflict
Reconstruction
Unit (PCRU)
at the end of 2004. Section 10.3 describes the development of the
UK’s
approach to
planning and preparation for post-conflict reconstruction and the
emergence
of the
broader concept of stabilisation.
723.
Sir Hilary
Synnott reported to the IPU on 17 September that, setting
aside
difficulties
securing CPA funding for the Essential Services Plan, sources of
funding
for CPA(South),
including the US Commanders Emergency Response Program
(CERPs),
were “starting to be unblocked” in Baghdad.398
Progress
was largely because
of better
communications between Baghdad and Basra but CPA(South) had
also
“radically
streamlined” its procedures.
724.
The Annotated
Agenda for the 18 September meeting of the AHMGIR reported
that
Mr Bearpark
had confirmed that CPA(Baghdad) would provide the US$97m required
to
fully fund
the Essential Services Plan, although the exact source of those
funds had not
725.
The Annotated
Agenda also stated that the US had decided to establish a
Program
Management
Office (PMO) to oversee CPA reconstruction funds. The decision was
a
response to
the persistent problems in transferring funds from CPA(Baghdad) and
CPA
regional
offices, however:
“Our
initial response is sceptical: the PMO will manage predominantly
US
funds,
which will require US contracting and procurement procedures to be
followed.
The
prospect of developing Iraqi capacity, and of opening up contracts
to include
UK
companies (in the interests of effectiveness and value for money)
remains
negligible.
Nevertheless, without participating in some form in the PMO, we
may
lose a
point of influence.”
397
Minute
[unattributed], 17 September 2003, ‘Meeting of the Secretaries of
State for Foreign Affairs,
Defence and
International Development – 16 September 2003 at
2.15pm’.
398
Email
Synnott to Crompton, 17 September 2003, ‘Funding for CPA(S):
Looking Better’.
399 Annotated
Agenda, 18 September 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
125