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6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003
660.  In addition, DFID was working on the paper on potential humanitarian implications
of conflict in Iraq, and British Trade International (BTI) was identifying priority sectors in
Iraq for British companies.
661.  The grid also listed departments responsible for different aspects of domestic
contingency planning, including community relations, refugee and asylum issues,
the terrorist threat, and the economic consequences of conflict.
662.  That work was later consolidated in a single paper produced by the CCS on
27 November, described later in this Section.
FCO PAPER: ‘INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION FOR IRAQ: WHAT, WHO
AND HOW?’
663.  The FCO paper ‘International Administration for Iraq: what, who and how?’
examined possible models for a UN role in the administration of Iraq.
664.  The FCO concluded that a UN transitional administration working alongside
an international security force would work, but planning needed to start as soon
as possible.
665.  Mr Gray sent the draft of a 12th FCO paper to the AHGI on 18 October.331
‘International Administration for Iraq: what, who and how?’ appears to have been
produced in response to the recommendation in the FCO paper on models for
administering a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq that work begin on examining a possible UN
role in more detail. It drew on recent UN experience in Afghanistan, Cambodia, East
Timor and Kosovo to distinguish between two approaches to international administration:
a “light” approach, monitoring a local administration’s decisions against
principles set out in a mandate provided by the Security Council; and
a more intrusive international administration implementing the mandate directly.
If the Iraqi regime fought to the end or the damage to Iraq was extensive, the
international administration would need to assume control of key areas. If Saddam
Hussein were overthrown quickly or “the bulk of Ba’ath apparatchiks switched sides”,
the lighter approach might be manageable.
666.  In both cases, key elements of the Security Council mandate would include:
reconstruction of war damage and delivery of humanitarian assistance;
internal and external security;
stopping Iraq’s WMD programmes;
ensuring respect for Iraq’s territorial integrity;
331  Letter Gray to Drummond, 18 October 2002, ‘Papers for the AHGI’ attaching Paper [unattributed],
17 October 2002, ‘International Administration for Iraq: what, who and how?’
225
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