4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
•
The UK was
“keen to raise awareness of the WMD and missile threat
beyond
the US/UK
partnership, to draw others into closer co-operation in
countering
the threat”.
•
“[M]ain
efforts over the past year” had been directed “at key EU partners
–
particularly
the French
and
Germans”.
•
The UK was
the US “partner of choice in countering WMD and
missile
proliferation”.
•
The US
Administration was “clearly more interested in deploying tools at
the
robust end
of the spectrum”, including “direct action”, rather than
“diplomatic
processes
to strengthen the treaty regimes or build wider multilateral
consensus
against
proliferation”.
182.
Mr Tim
Dowse, Head of FCO Counter-Proliferation Department in 2002, told
the
Inquiry
that, in a paper on counter-proliferation strategy produced in
July/August 2002,
Iraq was
viewed as a priority because it might be “the exception to the
broader rule that
WMD
programmes are generally acquired for defensive
purposes”.85
183.
Mr Dowse
added that it had been the political context which made Iraq a
priority.
184.
In a
subsequent private hearing, Sir William Ehrman, FCO Director
International
Security in
2002, told the Inquiry that the paper, approved by Mr Blair in
August
2002, stated:
“In country
programme terms, our top CP [counter-proliferation] priorities
are:
“Iraq –
because its WMD may be the exception to the rule that such
programmes
are usually
driven by defensive needs and, more importantly, are the most
likely
to be deployed
against UK forces and those of our allies.”86
185.
Asked if the
“threat from WMD from Iraq” would have continued to be
contained
if sanctions
had been maintained, Mr Dowse told the Inquiry:
“… the
nuclear threat would have been contained and there would have
been
constraints
on his other activities, although we believed he was making
progress
with
missiles, with chemical and biological weapons, despite the
constraints.
“The
problem was … we did not have high confidence that the sanctions
regime
186.
Mr John
Williams produced advice on a media strategy for Iraq
on 4 September.
85
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009, page 55.
86
Private
hearing, 14 June 2010, pages 2-3.
87
Public
hearing, 25 November 2009, page 60.
147