The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
258.
In response to
a question from President Chirac about whether it would be
the
inspectors
or the Security Council who decided whether Saddam had
co-operated,
Mr Blair
“insisted that it must be the Security Council”.
259.
President
Chirac agreed, “although the Security Council should make
its
judgement
on the basis of the inspectors’ report”. He “wondered whether it
would be
worth”
Mr Straw and Mr Dominique de Villepin, the French Foreign
Minister, “discussing
the
situation to see if we could find some flexibility”; or was it “too
late”?
260.
Mr Blair
said, “every avenue must be explored”.
261.
In the
subsequent conversation with President Bush about the French
position and
what to say
when the resolution was pulled, Mr Blair proposed that they
would need to
show that
France would not authorise the use of force in any
circumstances.126
262.
President
Lagos initially informed Mr Blair on 14 March that the UK
proposals did
not have
Chile’s support and that he was working on other
ideas.127
He
subsequently
informed
Mr Blair that he would not pursue his proposals unless
Mr Blair or President
Bush asked
him to.
263.
Mr Tony
Brenton, Chargé d'Affaires, British Embassy Washington, reported
that
President
Bush was determined to remove Saddam Hussein and to stick to the
US
timetable
for action. The UK’s “steadfastness” had been “invaluable” in
bringing in other
countries
in support of action.128
264.
In a
declaration on 15 March, France, with Germany and Russia,
attempted
to secure
support in the Security Council for continued
inspections.129
265.
At the Azores
Summit on 16 March, President Bush, Mr Blair and Prime
Minister
José María
Aznar of Spain agreed that, unless there was a fundamental change
in the
next 24
hours, the UN process would end.130
266.
In public, the
focus was on a “last chance for peace”. The joint
communiqué
contained a
final appeal to Saddam Hussein to comply with his obligations and
to
the Security
Council to back a second resolution containing an
ultimatum.
267.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote:
“So when I
look back … I know there was never any way Britain was not going
to
be with the
US at that moment, once we went down the UN route and Saddam
was
in breach.
Of course such a statement is always subject to in
extremis correction.
126
Letter
Rycroft to McDonald, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Conversation with Bush, 14 March’.
127
Letter
[Francis] Campbell to Owen, 14 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime
Minister’s Conversation with President
Lagos of
Chile, 14 March’.
128
Telegram
350 Washington to FCO London, 15 March 2003,
‘Iraq’.
129
UN Security
Council, 18 March 2003, ‘Letter dated 15 March 2003 from
the Permanent Representative
of Germany
to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security
Council’ (S/2003/320).
130
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2013, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in
the Azores: 16 March’.
604