3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
273.
Following
Mr Blair’s meeting with Mr Jacques Chirac, the French
President, on
13
December, in the margins of the European Council, Sir David
Manning reported that
President
Chirac:
“… had
sounded sceptical about the need for military action in Iraq. He
would only
support
this if Saddam made a huge mistake.”91
274.
Following
Iraq’s declaration, Mr Blair concluded that it was hard to see
how
conflict
could be avoided unless Saddam Hussein started to behave
honestly.
275.
On 15
December, Mr Straw and Secretary Powell discussed the Iraqi
declaration
and the
need for “hard, on‑the‑ground evidence” to secure international
support for
military
action.92
They also
discussed “flood[ing] the zone with intelligence
driven
inspections”,
and an article by Harlan Ullman in the Washington
Post which
had
“correctly”
made the point that “if you don’t find anything, then there can be
no
casus belli”.
276.
Mr Blair
sent a note to officials in No.10 on 16 December.93
277.
On Iraq,
Mr Blair wrote that the Iraqi declaration was “plainly
inconsistent with
our
intelligence. The test will be to prove it is false.” Mr Blair
asked for a report on
Dr Blix’s
“modus operandi” and to see him later that week or in early January
if that
were possible.
“We also
need to build on the whole issue of WMD and show its
importance.
AC [Alastair
Campbell] to do a communications note on this, amplifying his
earlier
one this
weekend. But studying the Iraqi declaration, it is hard to see how
conflict
can be
avoided, unless Saddam starts to behave honestly. My sense of
Russia and
France is
that albeit reluctantly, they accept this and will support a new
resolution if
the breach
by Saddam is clear and significant.”
279.
Mr Campbell’s
response on 19 December is addressed later in this
Section.
280.
Sir David
Manning advised Mr Blair to warn President Bush not to rush
to
a final
judgement. Time would be needed to build the “strongest possible
case”
against
Iraq, and to secure a second resolution.
91
Letter
Rycroft to Sinclair, 13 December 2015, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting
with Chirac, 13 December’.
92
Letter
Straw to Manning, 17 December 2002, ‘Powell: Iraq’.
93
Note Blair
[to No.10 officials], 16 December 2002, [extract
‘Iraq’].
51