The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
213.
Mr Straw
and Secretary Rice discussed the Constitution on 29
August.175
Dr Rice
highlighted
that the process against Ba’athists set out in the Constitution was
“on
an
individual basis rather than simply on proof of party membership”
and described
that as “a
very big concession”. To deal with fears about individuals being
victimised,
they
discussed a potential international review body which would
consider the
decision‑making
process, but not re‑hear cases.
214.
Mr Straw
recorded that he had asked for some work to be done on this
idea,
and asked
Mr Patey to discuss the concept with Ambassador
Khalilzad.
215.
At the end of
August, the US Red Team published its “Integrated
Counterinsurgency
Strategy for Iraq”.176
It stated
that one of the conditions for a
successful
counter‑insurgency campaign was to:
“Work with
Iraqi leaders in the next government to continue progress in
increasing
political
accommodation and effective cooperation to solve specific
policy
challenges.
Place priority on finalizing and implementing agreements to redress
key
divisive
issues (e.g. de‑Ba’athification, professionalizing ISF institution
etc.)”
216.
UK responses
to the Red Team’s report are described in Section 9.3.
217.
On 12 October,
the IPU reported that broad agreement had been reached
on
changes to
the draft Constitution, including provisions on
de‑Ba’athification.177
Those
amendments
(to Article 131) were:
•
Membership
of the Ba’ath Party alone would not be considered sufficient
basis
for
prosecution. Members would enjoy equality and protection under the
law
unless they
were covered by “the provisions of de‑Ba’athification and the
orders
issued
under it”.
•
The Council
of Representatives would form a committee to monitor and
review
acts of the
de‑Ba’athification Commission.
218.
Alongside
other measures, the IPU commented that these changes might
“help
significantly
increase the overall vote in favour of the
Constitution”.
219.
An IPU paper
on Sunni outreach dated 27 October referred to the
same
amendments
as “a step forward” and proposed that the UK should “give our
assurance
that we
will push hard for implementation of Article 131 in the next
Parliament in a way
which
allows non‑criminal ex‑Ba’athists into government
service”.178
220.
In an update
on Sunni outreach two weeks later, the IPU described
the
shared UK
and US goal on de‑Ba’athification as “to persuade the Iraqis to
repeal
175
Letter
Straw to Sheinwald, 30 August 2005, ‘Conversation with US Secretary
of State, 29 August’.
176
Report Red
Team, 31 August 2005, ‘An Integrated Counterinsurgency Strategy for
Iraq’.
177
Paper IPU,
12 October 2005, ‘Amendments to the Draft Iraqi Constitution’
attaching ‘Further
Amendments
to the Draft Iraqi Constitution’.
178
Paper IPU,
27 October 2005, ‘Sunni Arab Outreach’.
42