9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
457.
In his weekly
report on 21 January, Lt Gen Lamb observed:
“… the
situation we find ourselves in Iraq is perhaps the most complex
that I
have ever
seen in my 35 years of soldiering … Every one of our actions
results in
multiple
and unexpected consequences – requiring an increased understanding
of
the
unintended implications that occur … But … one thing seems to have
become
crystal
clear – the detrimental effect that Iranian influence is having on
the people
of Iraq,
whether they be Sunni, Shia or Kurd alike.
“Recent
Government of Iraq (GOI) and US actions that have ‘stressed’ the
Iranian
Quds
[Force]247
have had a
significantly positive effect both on the political front,
and
the
prospects for reconciliation. The Sunnis are encouraged … But,
perhaps more
notable
though are the many Shia moderates who have also seen the actions
as a
positive
move … in curtailing what they see as a malign Iranian influence
…
“So, I
sense that we may have just underestimated the nature and danger of
the
Iranian
influence … They all fear the extent to which the influence could
undermine
the Iraqi
culture and potentially that of Islam in the region itself
…
“The
Persian tiger, I sense, therefore has a direct effect on the issue
of practical
reconciliation,
if not the outcome of our endeavour. If the militias are seen to be
the
accelerant,
then I would venture that the removal of the malign Iranian
influence
would
represent a major decelerator to the situation.”248
458.
On 22 January,
the Iraq Senior Officials Group discussed a draft paper
on
transition
in southern Iraq, intended for DOP.249
The Group
agreed that:
“… the
paper needed to distinguish more clearly between the related but
distinct
processes
of re‑posturing and PIC and the arguments we needed to make
for
each process”.
459.
On 22 January,
Mr Blair met ACM Stirrup and senior officials from the FCO,
the
MOD, SIS,
DFID and the Cabinet Office for an update on Iraq.250
460.
Mr Blair
said: “It was clear a significant effort was required on
reconciliation and
reconstruction.”
He suggested that the key steps in Basra were:
•
to clarify
and fill gaps in the capabilities of the Iraqi Army’s 10th
Division;
•
to ensure
that the Iraqi Government put capable people in place (about
which
he intended
to speak to Prime Minister Maliki); and
•
to take on
the leaders of militant JAM.
247 A
special section of the Revolutionary Guards which undertakes
operations outside Iranian territory.
248
Minute Lamb
to CDS, 21 January 2007, ‘SBMR‑I Weekly Report (242) 21 Jan
07’.
249
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 22 January 2007,
‘Iraq Senior Officials Group’.
250
Letter
Banner to Siddiq, 22 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Meeting with
Officials’.
85