The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

280.  Mr Bowen told the Inquiry that one reason for establishing the IPU was to set up a

counterpart to ORHA: “as soon as we … understood where the centre of gravity was in

America … we set up … a centre of gravity that could interact with it”. At this early stage

in the relationship, before misgivings about ORHA had begun to emerge in Whitehall,

that seemed still to be the intention.

Preparing for the UK’s “exemplary” role in the South

281.  On 3 February, Maj Gen Brims told UK military commanders that, in the event

of an invasion, UK forces could “set the pace” for Phase IV operations.

282.  Maj Gen Brims issued the first GOC Directive for UK military commanders involved

in Operation (Op) TELIC139 on 3 February.140 It stated: “We only win on successful

implementation of Phase IV”, and continued:

“The Phase IV requirements have yet to emerge. I am confident that our people

have the physical and mental agility to attend to it quickly, thoughtfully and effectively

… But two important points:

a. There must be no triumphalism … we must restore, foster, Iraqi dignity in

our AO and work together as far as possible to achieve Phase IV for their

benefit.

b. We shall probably be the first Coalition forces to implement Phase IV. We

can set the pace. The world media will be reporting our activities.”

283.  Also on 3 February, DFID officials recommended to Ms Short that DFID second

six Civil/Military Humanitarian Advisers to the UK military and ORHA, in order “to take

further forward our objective of refining the military planning options to ensure the

humanitarian consequences of any conflict in Iraq are fully addressed”.141

284.  The Inquiry has not seen Ms Short’s response, but DFID did second a number of

staff over the following weeks.142

285.  Later in February, DFID officials sought policy guidance from Ms Short on the

scope of DFID co-operation with military forces in “complex emergencies”.

139 Operation TELIC was the codename for the involvement of UK Armed Forces in the military campaign

to remove the threat from Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction.

140 Minute Brims to various, 3 February 2003, ‘Op Telic – GOC’s Directive One’.

141 Minute Conflict & Humanitarian Affairs Department [junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID],

3 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Refining the Military Options’.

142 Letter Warren to Rycroft, 7 March 2003, [untitled] attaching Paper DFID, [undated], ‘DFID Planning on

Iraq’.

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