9.3 |
July 2004 to May 2005
552.
Reporting a
discussion of the Chiefs of Staff on 20 April about the threat
from
Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, Ms Aldred wrote to Sir Nigel Sheinwald: “as there is
no
information
on possible targets or timing, the military view was that little
more could
be done.
The Prime Minister should be alerted to the
threat.”304
553.
Ms Aldred also
reported that the next military rotation would result in UK
force
levels
increasing by around 480 personnel. Ms Aldred:
“… made the
point that in circumstances where we were benefiting from
the
improvement
in security in Iraq in general, and MND(SE) in particular, it would
be
very hard
to explain why an increase in force levels of this magnitude was
required
on top of
the increase which had already taken place to compensate for the
Dutch
withdrawal
from Muthanna. Jock Stirrup … saw the point …”
554.
On 28 April,
Prime Minister Designate Ja’afari presented the majority of his
Cabinet
to the TNA
for ratification.305
555.
The list,
which was approved by 180 of the 185 TNA members present,
covered
two of the
four Deputy Prime Minister positions and 27 of the 32 Ministerial
posts.
Eight of
the Cabinet had previously held Ministerial office in Iraq in
either the Iraqi
Governing
Council or Interim Iraqi Government.
556.
On 2 May, Mr
Chaplin reported that many Sunnis had:
“…
responded critically to the announcement of the new government …
They are
unhappy
that Ja’afari chose to put his Cabinet to the vote before a
satisfactory
agreement
had been reached on acceptable Sunni
representation.”306
557.
Negotiations
between the political parties on how to fill the remaining posts
had
continued
right up to the last moment. The British Embassy Baghdad reported
that in the
end Dr
Ja’afari had concluded that announcing a nearly-complete list was
better than
announcing
nothing.
558.
Dr Ja’afari
emphasised to the TNA that the Ministers were chosen for
their
competence
and willingness to work as part of the team. Ministries were not
fiefdoms
and a
Minister was “not an emperor”. Speaking about efforts to ensure
Sunni Arab
participation,
he said the election results should be honoured but “the unfairness
done
to our
brother Sunni Arabs in those elections” should also be
acknowledged.
559.
Mr Chaplin
commented that, although the main Sunni parties had put forward
a
number of
prospective candidates for Ministerial posts, very few had been
appointed.
Some
suspected that Dr Ja’afari’s party intended to “impose” their own
Sunni Arab
304
Minute
Aldred to Sheinwald, 20 April 2005, ‘Iraq – COS 20
April’.
305
eGram
3590/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 28 April 2005, ‘Iraq: New Cabinet
Ratified by the TNA’.
306
eGram
3762/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 2 May 2005, ‘Iraq: New Government:
Finishing the Job’.
483