The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
Government
is content”. If that envisaged military action in the timescales to
which US
military
planners were working, there would be a need to address campaign
objectives.
That would
be “necessary to fill the current gap between” the UK’s “existing
policy
objectives
and the likely nature of any US‑led military operations, the scale
and intensity
of which
should not be underestimated”.
1272.
The MOD
provided seven annexes with more detailed information.
1273.
Annex A
addressed “Evolving US military thinking”.
1274.
Annex B,
addressing UK military preparations, stated that there was a
need
to identify
and address shortfalls in manpower and equipment in units nominated
for
operations,
and that they would require significant training.
1275.
In addition,
the MOD:
•
had
approached the market to charter shipping; and
•
was making
preparations for call‑out of Reserves.
1276.
Annex C
provided a snapshot of current UK and US force levels in the
region
and a
projection of the probable build‑up of forces based on Package 3 as
currently
endorsed
and the ATG with 3 Commando Brigade. The ATG was now planned to be
in
theatre by
mid‑February and would transit the Suez canal 15 days earlier than
previously
planned; 7
Armoured Brigade could be in theatre by mid‑March, but deployment
of the
full
Package 3 would take a further 30 days.
1277.
Annexes D and
E, setting out the UK force packages originally approved
by
Ministers
and an update on the ATG, stated that the MOD had strengthened
the
amphibious
element of the force to include the Headquarters of 3 Commando
Brigade,
which would
command both UK and US forces, and earmarked 42 Commando
Group,
to deploy
by air after the ATG if required. The ATG was due to depart from
the UK from
16 January.
HMS Ark Royal would deploy as a second helicopter landing
platform
without its
fast jets.
1278.
Sir David
was told the options for the land contribution were “under review”;
and
that:
“There are some large and difficult issues here.”
1279.
Annex F was a
“short note” on the options. It described Package 3,
“previously
endorsed by
Ministers for planning purposes” as “a divisional HQ commanding a
single
square
armoured brigade with appropriate divisional and logistic support”,
and that the
MOD had
assumed “for some time” the US would provide a similar brigade. The
US had
“now
decided” to offer a lighter regiment, but that would mean the
UK‑led division would
be
“unbalanced, and its mission … more risky”.
364