3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
•
The
“proposed declaration
of Iraq’s WMD should be
an update rather than
a final and
complete declaration … [pursued] in parallel with the return
of
inspectors,
not delay the inspectors’ return”.
•
“Publicly” the
UK should “describe [Iraq’s] offer of accepting inspectors
as
a tactical
ploy, exactly as we had expected. We suspected that he
[Saddam
Hussein]
had absolutely no intention of complying with all UN demands.
It
showed
[the] tough approach was working. We must maintain the
pressure.
The inspection
regime must be tough and able to do its job.”
•
Mr Blair
would speak to President Putin “in concert with” President Bush’s
call.
•
The UK
“should keep in close touch with Blix, so that the resolution took
account
of his
practical considerations”. He would “have to be very tough with the
Iraqis”.
64.
The record of
the meeting was sent to the Ministry of Defence (MOD),
Cabinet
Office, the
Private Secretary to Sir Richard Dearlove (Chief of the Secret
Intelligence
Service
(SIS)), and to Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Sir Christopher Meyer
(British
Ambassador
to the US), Sir John Holmes (British Ambassador to France)
and
Sir Roderic
Lyne (British Ambassador to the Russian Federation).
65.
Sir David
Manning subsequently informed Dr Rice of the conclusions of
Mr Blair’s
66.
The record of
that conversation shows differences of view on the advantages
and
disadvantages
of demanding a comprehensive Iraqi declaration; whether the
resolution
should
address non‑WMD issues; and the details of a new inspection
regime.
67.
Sir David and
Dr Rice agreed that the purpose of the resolution was to
dismantle
Saddam
Hussein’s WMD, not to get the inspectors back into Iraq: “The
inspections were
a means to
this end, not an end in themselves.” They also discussed the risk
that the
inspectors
would find nothing. Sir David said he thought “we were likely to
find evidence,
even though
Saddam would have been busily hiding and disguising his stocks of
WMD”.
68.
Sir David and
Dr Rice agreed that Sir Jeremy Greenstock and Ambassador
John
Negroponte,
US Permanent Representative to the UN in New York, should be
asked
for “their
expert advice on next steps about content and
handling”.
69.
Reporting a
statement by Mr Straw, the FCO informed the UK Permanent
Mission
in New York
that: “We see no advantage in an early UNSC [UN Security
Council]
debate on
the Iraqi offer … But we accept that pressure for Council
discussion may
19
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
20
Telegram
535 FCO London to UKMIS New York, 17 September 2002, ‘Iraq: Letter
Accepting Weapons
Inspectors’.
211