The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
“The major
problem was the absence of popular support. What could be
done
to spark
off the popular uprising?”
•
“Without
public support the conduct of the campaign in particular Phase
IV
would need
to be revised.”
•
“… critical
assumptions about the nature of the hinterland in which the
campaign
would be
fought are now proving to be mistaken.”
•
“The
absence of a popular reaction against them [Saddam Hussein’s
regime]”
was
“eroding support for the campaign internationally”.
•
Impatience
would have risks; the UK needed to hold its nerve.
•
The
strategy should be to “continue to isolate and destroy regime
facilities …
whilst at
the same time showing that where we control the ground, life is
better”.
283.
Sir David
Manning sent the report to Mr Blair in preparation for the Ad
Hoc Meeting
284.
On 28 March,
in a brief “intended to provoke thought rather than to
provide
authoritative
assessment”, the DIS Red Team (see Section 6.5) raised the
possibility that
the
Coalition had not fully appreciated the implications of Saddam
Hussein’s asymmetric
tactics,
and specifically:
•
urban
guerrilla warfare;
•
irregular
warfare against lines of communication;
•
threat of
chemical, biological and missile attack; and
•
the
willingness of the regime to breach international humanitarian
law
285.
Irregular
warfare against the Coalition’s lines of communication had caused
delay
and
casualties, and created the risk of Coalition over-reaction. While
the Iraq regime
was still
in place, Iraqis would “fear the consequences of betraying the
regime more than
they
support Coalition Forces”. That had been “unwittingly supported by
the Coalition
information
campaign, which has encouraged Iraqis to stay at
home”.
286.
The MOD update
on the morning of 29 March reported that:
“UK forces
are not encircling or besieging Basra (contrary to media reports).
There
are no
forces to the east of Basra and routes remain open into the town to
allow the
flow of
civilians and aid.” 170
168
Manuscript
comment Manning on Letter PS/C to Manning, 28 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Losing the Hinterland’
with UK
document, [undated], ‘Iraq: Losing the Hinterland’.
169
Report
Defence Intelligence Staff Red Team, 28 March 2003, ‘Saddam’s First
Week’.
170
Minute
[MOD], 29 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Update for the Number 10 Sitrep – as
at 0430Z 29 March 2003’.
48