12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
558.
On 15 July
2004, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP)
considered
a paper by
Mr Straw entitled ‘Iraq: the Next Six Months’.505
The paper
outlined the
desired
position for Iraq by January 2005. For the ISF, the objective
was:
“Significantly
increased Iraqi security capacity and capability with Iraqi forces
in local
control
around much of the country and a reduced reliance on MNF‑I, paving
the
way for
foreign troop reductions in 2005.”
559.
The priority
was identified as continued support to Iraqiisation through
training,
equipping
and mentoring of ISF, with a focus on command and civilian
oversight
(particularly
of the army and the Iraqi National Intelligence
Service).
560.
The priorities
identified in Mr Straw’s paper were agreed by
DOP.506
561.
On 21 July,
the Annotated Agenda for the AHMGIR reported that recruitment to
the
ISF was
“buoyant” and equipment was being delivered.507
The ISF
were:
“…
increasingly taking the lead in patrolling and on specific
operations. Their
credibility
with the Iraqi people seems to be increasing … and local control
has been
achieved in
some areas, particularly MND(SE).”
562.
The Annotated
Agenda noted that “despite the growth of capacity,
significant
capability
gaps remain” and both the Joint Headquarters and proposed National
Joint
Operations
Centre would “require further advice, supervision and equipment
before Iraqi
command is
satisfactory”. ISF units would “require careful command and control
training
and
mentoring once formed”.
563.
An annex to
the Annotated Agenda stated that overall numbers were already
close
to target
(a total of 233,000 ISF personnel against a planned total of
“around 260,000”
by January
2005). It stated that the IPS had “already hit its full manning
levels”, would
“be 100
percent equipped by end 04”, and with the completion of current
training
programmes
be “fully operational” by June 2005.
564.
The IPS was
also focused on the need “to slim” the police force “by up
to
30,000 men”.
The annex stated that “just fewer than 3,000” Iraqi Army personnel
had
been
trained and the rate of recruitment and training was “set to go up
to end 2004”.
565.
Lt
Gen Petraeus carried out a “Troops To Task” assessment in July
and August
2004 with
General George Casey, who replaced Lt Gen Sanchez as Commander
of
the
Coalition’s military command in June 2004.508
That was to
identify what the size
505
Paper FCO,
13 July 2004, ‘Iraq: the Next Six Months’.
506
Minutes, 15
July 2004, DOP meeting.
507 Annotated
Agenda, 21 July 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
508
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
177