The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
437.
Attached to
the paper was a core script on Iraq, and one on the
December
elections,
which said:
“We have a
strategy and it has remained constant. It is to participate
alongside the
international
community in supporting the development of democracy, peace
and
security in
Iraq …
“Any
immediate withdrawal, or one determined by arbitrary timeliness or
under the
threat of
terror, would hand over Iraq to the terrorists and be a victory for
terrorism –
not only in
Iraq but in wider international terms.”
438.
On 16
November, at the request of the ISOG, the JIC considered the
prospects for
the
election.204
It assessed
that:
“Even with
international pressure, the process of forming a new Iraqi
cabinet
after
December’s election is unlikely to be swift: we expect a period of
protracted
wrangling,
well into early 2006, during which time there will be no
effective
government.
Negotiations will centre on the number of Ministerial slots for
each
political
group; the relative importance of each slot; and the personalities
of
individual
candidates. We expect vigorous arguments from Sunni Arabs to keep
out
‘Iranian-backed’
politicians, and from Shia to deny ‘Ba’athists’ senior
office.”
439.
The JIC judged
that the new Assembly was likely to be more politically
complex
than the
TNA, with greater influence wielded by both Sunni Arabs and
Sadrists.
440.
The new
Ministerial team would need to reflect that complexity. On the one
hand,
this would
demonstrate a more inclusive approach, which would undermine the
causes
of the
Sunni insurgency; on the other, the inclusion of credible Sunni
figures would add
to the
government’s fragility.
441.
In a telegram
to London reflecting on the likely departure of Prime Minister
Ja’afari
and who
might succeed him, Mr Patey wrote:
“Like the
TAL, the Constitution provides for a weak Prime Minister, dependent
on
consensus.
Any successor to Ja’afari will have a hard time managing what will
still
be a large,
unwieldy and ill-disciplined coalition and increasingly independent
and
self-confident
institutions.”205
442.
In a video
conference on 22 November, Mr Blair reported to President Bush
that
Sunni
outreach activity seemed to be bearing fruit.206
204
JIC
Assessment, 16 November 2005, ‘Iraq: Election
Prospects’.
205
eGram
18722/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 19 November 2005, ‘Iraq: After
Ja’afari, What Next?’.
206
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 22 November 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush: Iraq’.
562