The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

16. On 13 June, Mr Jack Straw, the Foreign Secretary, sent Mr Blair an update on

progress towards a new Iraqi Constitution, including the procedural challenges ahead.6

17. Mr Straw reported that there had been progress. The National Assembly (TNA) had

formed a Constitutional Committee, to which the UN had offered its expertise. But the

detail had yet to be agreed.

18. In Mr Straw’s view, the key challenges were to ensure that the draft text was seen to

reflect the views of Iraq’s three main communities (Shia Arabs, Sunni Arabs and Kurds)

and sticking to the timetable set out in the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL).

19. The TAL said that a draft Constitution should be produced by 15 August, ahead of a

referendum on 15 October and elections by 15 December.

20. Mr Straw described the UK urging key players to maintain momentum, while putting

in place a process which would deliver a credible text on time. The UK would also

provide practical assistance as necessary.

21. Attached to Mr Straw’s minute was a paper written by the IPU at the request of the

Iraq Strategy Group which provided more detail on the drafting process and what could

be done to improve it.

22. The paper said that the Constitutional Committee had formed sub-committees

tasked with particular themes (for example, federalism) and Prime Minister Ja’afari had

appointed a Ministerial Constitutional Committee.

23. Mr Nicholas ‘Fink’ Haysom, Head of the UN Office of Constitutional Support

(UNOCS), had offered the Constitutional Committee UN support and guidance, and

initially received a “cautiously welcoming” response.

24. The IPU paper set out the two main challenges to the process. The first was

ensuring credibility, by “correcting the Sunni Arab deficit” in the membership of the

Constitutional Committee and starting public outreach early. The second was keeping

to the schedule. If the timetable slipped, the UN’s plan was to extend the drafting period

and compress the time for consultation before the referendum on 15 October.

25. Prime Minister Ja’afari told Mr Patey that the Ministerial Committee was intended

“to help drive the process forward” and so ensure completion on time.7

26. On 14 June, Mr Patey reported to the FCO that there remained no agreement on

Sunni representation on the Constitutional Committee.8 Only two of its 55 members

were Sunni Arabs.

6 Minute Straw to Prime Minister, 13 June 2005, ‘Iraq: Constitution’ attaching Paper IPU, 10 June 2005,

‘Iraq: Improving the Constitution Process’.

7 eGram 6667/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 15 June 2005, ‘Introductory Call on Prime Minister Ja’afari,

14 June 2005’.

8 eGram 6606/05 Baghdad to FCO London, 14 June 2005, ‘Constitutional Committee Update’.

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