The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“We may not
ultimately need to be able to point to vast stockpiles of agent,
missiles
or
warheads. But we would at the least need hard evidence of a
programme that
could be
mobilised at short notice and concealment activity.”
118.
Mr Howard
also reported that there had been strong support for a scheme
to
incentivise
and attract scientists to speak to the Coalition.
119.
Separately,
Mr Howard advised Mr Scarlett that he saw no need to
appoint a senior
political
figure to oversee the Coalition effort on WMD
detection.55
His
impression was
that
Secretary Rumsfeld and Mr Stephen Cambone, US Under Secretary
of Defense
for
Intelligence, had a firm political grip on policy and execution.
The difficulty lay in
transmitting
the sense of priority and urgency into action on the
ground.
120.
A paper
prepared by the MOD on 3 May for the Ad Hoc Ministerial Group
on Iraq
Rehabilitation
(AHMGIR) on 8 May, stated that, by 30 April,
investigations had begun at
19 of the
147 highest-priority potential WMD-related sites identified by the
US and UK
before the
invasion, and at a further 42 ad hoc sites.56
There were
400 lower-priority
potential
WMD sites remaining to be investigated.
121.
The MOD stated
that the proposed mission of the ISG was to:
“Co-ordinate
and conduct intelligence exploitation throughout Iraq and
locate,
disable and
eliminate Iraqi CBRN/M [chemical, biological, radiological,
nuclear/
missile]
production, storage facilities and materials in order to: complete
the removal
of the
Iraqi regime; enable the prosecution of war crimes and crimes
against
humanity;
determine the status of Kuwaiti POWs … remove the threat from
Iraqi
WMD and
assist the Global War on Terrorism.”
122.
The concept of
operations for the ISG was “still fluid” and could pose
some
difficulties
for the UK.
123.
The FCO and
the MOD were “developing proposals for a reconstitution
of
UNMOVIC
tailored to the new permissive environment in Iraq”.
124.
The Cabinet
Office’s Annotated Agenda for the AHMGIR stated that
“US
investigation
efforts are currently ad hoc but will be established on a sounder
footing
from the
end of May”. The ISG would have over 1,000 specialist staff.
Officials invited
Ministers
to “note the progress made and the time likely before
investigations produce
55
Letter
Howard to Scarlett, 2 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Weapons of Mass
Destruction: My Visit to Washington’.
56 Annotated
Agenda, 7 May 2003, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
Rehabilitation meeting attaching
Paper MOD,
3 May 2003, ‘Annex E: WMD and the Work of the Iraq Survey
Group’.
57 Annotated
Agenda, 7 May 2003, Ad Hoc Ministerial Group on Iraq
Rehabilitation meeting.
448