9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
75.
On 15 July,
the Iraq Strategy Group (ISG) considered a draft version of a paper
for
DOP(I) from
Dr Reid on operational transition in Iraq.36
76.
The paper
described a process in which Iraqi Security Forces would take
primacy
province by
province. The MNF would take on a reserve role as they did so. So
long
as Iraqi
capacity continued to increase and the security situation did not
deteriorate
seriously,
the transfer would be implemented from October in Maysan and
Muthanna.
Basra and
Dhi Qar would follow in spring 2006. This would lead to a reduced
profile for
UK forces,
and reductions in numbers to around 3,000 by summer
2006.
“The plans
are entirely consistent with Multi-National Forces – Iraq (MNF-I)
planning;
General
Casey (the US force commander in Iraq) has been briefed on them and
is
content.”
78.
In the paper,
Dr Reid asked DOP(I) to agree that detailed plans should be drawn
up
for
explaining the process to the Iraqi people, the US, other allies,
Parliament and the
UK
public.
79.
After a
discussion, the ISG concluded that the paper needed
to:
•
make clear
that the process of force reduction was reversible;
•
explain the
degree of US concern about the possibility of “MND(SE) getting
out
in front”,
which should not be over-emphasised;
•
explain the
context in terms of ISF development; and
•
cover more
clearly the implications for other government departments
and
80.
Dr Reid spoke
to Mr Jonathan Powell, Mr Blair’s Chief of Staff, on 18
July about the
arrangements
for handling the paper, given the sensitivity surrounding the issue
and the
risk of
leaks.38
They agreed
that it would be best for Dr Reid to produce a full paper
for
Mr Blair
and a single page of recommendations for other Ministers who were
members
of
DOP(I).
81.
In the event,
the full paper was circulated by the Cabinet Office to all
DOP(I)
members
with the instruction that it should not be shared
further.39
82.
Dr Reid
described the principal risks to the timetable for drawdown
as:
36
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Iraq Senior Officials, 15 July
2005, ‘MOD Paper on Operational
Transition
in Iraq’ attaching MOD Paper, ‘Operational Transition in
Iraq’.
37
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 15 July 2005, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group’.
38
Letter Reid
to Powell, 18 July 2005, ‘Operational Transition in Iraq’ attaching
Paper Secretary of State
for
Defence, [undated], ‘Operational Transition in Iraq’.
39
Minute
Aldred to DOP(I), 20 July 2005, ‘Note by the Secretaries’ attaching
Paper Secretary of State for
Defence,
‘Operational Transition in Iraq’.
503