12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
The meeting
heard that that could delay the project until early April, but that
it could
“prove
beneficial, as the project will require the new Minister’s backing
if it is to
be effective”.
648.
At the next
Iraq GCPP Strategy Meeting on 16 March, the meeting was told
that
two new
consultants had been appointed and would be deployed to Iraq
mid‑April.592
649.
In his May
2005 review of policing priorities and resources, Acting Deputy
Chief
Constable
Colin Smith, Chief Police Adviser Iraq, identified the need for a
senior UK
civil
servant (from the Home Office) with experience in police strategic
development and
police
structure to assist the MOI.593
650.
That request
was picked up by Mr Michael Gillespie, Home Office Head of
the
Public
Order and Police Co‑Operation Unit.594
He advised
Mr Peter Storr, Home Office
International
Director, that there were financial implications to the request, as
the
FCO would
not reimburse salary or the additional costs of deployment. Aside
from the
financial
implications, Mr Gillespie raised “the issue of whether this
is a good use of
Home Office
resources”.
651.
On 27 November
2009, a draft review of the support provided to the
MOI
and IPS was
circulated.595
It stated
that the MOI project had been merged with the
FCO‑led IPS
training programme in 2007 following the last external review, to
create
“greater
co‑ordination and a more cross‑sectoral approach to Security Sector
Reform”.
Responsibility
for the MOI element was transferred to the US in June
2009.
In his
book The
Occupation of Iraq, Mr Ali
A Allawi, former IGC Defence Minister gave
details of
a major corruption scandal in the Iraqi IMOD
(IMOD).596
He stated
that the
Ministry of
Finance was instructed to appropriate US$1.7bn in one lump sum, and
put
it at the
disposal of the IMOD. The money was to be used for the formation of
two rapid
deployment
divisions but no justification was given for the amount required
and limits on
spending
were removed.
On 16 May
2005, the Iraqi Bureau of Supreme Audit597
presented a
“damning report”
to the
incoming Prime Minister. Later in 2005, the Director General of
Finance at the
IMOD was
arrested and helped in exposing the involvement of senior IMOD
officials.
Two of her
colleagues, the Director General of Planning and the Inspector
General, were
subsequently
murdered.
592
Minutes, 16
March 2005, Iraq GCPP Strategy meeting.
593
Report
Smith, 15 May 2005, ‘Next Steps on Policing – Review’.
594
Minute
Gillespie to Storr, 26 May 2005, ‘Iraq: Request for a UK Civil
Servant (Home Office) to act as
Ministry of
Interior Civilian Police Adviser: Baghdad’.
595
Paper
Stabilisation Unit [junior official] and Howlett‑Bolton, 27
November 2009, ‘Review of the support
to the
Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service
Programme’.
596 Allawi
AA. The
Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the
Peace. Yale
University Press, 2007.
597
The Iraqi
Bureau of Supreme Audit was responsible for
anti‑corruption.
197