4.2 |
Iraq WMD assessments, July to September 2002
310.
A DIS record
of a meeting held by Mr Miller on 9 September recorded that
the DIS
had been
asked to address a number of points including:
•
“the
provision of more detail on Iraq’s military capability to use
WMD”;
•
“the
provision of more information on the retention of experts and
expertise
relating to
WMD”;
•
“to provide
information if possible on the diversion and attempted
illicit
procurement
of dual-use materials and equipment”; and
•
“the
provision of a timeline for the development of a nuclear weapon by
Iraq
if it were
to acquire fissile material.”150
311.
Mr Scarlett
produced a first draft of the new dossier on 10 September
which
drew on the
9 September JIC Assessment and the recent intelligence
reports
about
Saddam Hussein’s willingness to use chemical and biological
weapons.
The draft
stated that Iraq could deploy such weapons within 45 minutes of
the
order being
given for their use.
312.
A first draft
of the revised dossier was produced on 10 September and sent
to
Mr Campbell,
Mr Powell, Sir David Manning, Sir David Omand, the Private
Secretaries
to
Mr Straw and Mr Hoon, Mr Desmond Bowen, who
succeeded Mr McKane as Deputy
Head of OD
Sec in the week beginning 9 September, and to Mr John
Williams.151
313.
Mr Scarlett
wrote that he had had “considerable help from John Williams
and
others in
the Foreign Office”. The draft required further work and he could
not confirm
that he was
“content with the overall tone … and the balance between the main
text
and the
Annexes”, but it had “now reached the stage where it would be
useful” to have
advice on
presentation from Mr Campbell. Mr Williams might also
offer further views.
314.
Mr Scarlett
added that the draft drew “on all the available intelligence
identified
so far”. He
was “most grateful for the co-operation of the SIS, GCHQ and the
DIS in
constructing
the key section on Iraq’s capabilities”; and the drafters continued
to “check
for any
further intelligence for inclusion in the text”.
315.
Mr Scarlett
concluded by asking recipients to “hold the text very tight”
and
to “continue
to refrain from public reference to its contents”.
316.
The draft
Foreword drew heavily on Mr Williams’ 5 September
revisions
to Mr McKane’s
draft “capping piece”.
317.
The Executive
Summary stated that the paper set out the Government’s
“knowledge”
of Iraq’s programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction,
traced
150
Minute DIGI
to [CDI and DCDI Private Offices and others], 9 September 2002,
‘Iraq Dossier Meeting –
9 Sep
02’.
151
Minute
Scarlett to Campbell, 10 September 2002, ‘The Iraq
Dossier’.
173