The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
100.
Lord Boyce,
CDS from February 2001 to May 2003, told the Inquiry that
his
responsibility
was to advise on military capability and capacity.67
101.
As the
principal military adviser to the Defence Secretary and the
Government/
Prime
Minister, the CDS will attend Cabinet or its sub-committees as
required and will
draw on the
operationally focused advice provided by the Service Chiefs of
Staff and
senior
civil servants through the Chiefs of Staff
Committee.68
102.
The CDS,
advised by the Vice Chief of the Defence Staff (VCDS) and the
Service
Chiefs, is
responsible for the formulation of the military strategy and its
coherence with
government
policy. Following the Defence Secretary’s direction, the CDS is
responsible
for the
planning, direction and conduct of all military
operations.
103.
Through a CDS
Directive, he:
•
Appoints
the operational commander.
•
Provides
strategic direction.
•
Identifies
the military conditions for success.
•
Designates
the theatre and joint operations area.
•
Specifies
force levels and resources.
•
Promulgates
the constraints on the use of force.
•
Sets the
strategic intelligence requirements.69
104.
The Chiefs of
Staff Committee (COS) is the main forum through which the
CDS
seeks and
obtains the collective military advice of the single Service Chiefs
of Staff,
and through
which he discharges his responsibility for the preparation and
conduct
of military
operations.70
105.
The Committee
is chaired by the CDS. The three Service Chiefs of Staff and
the
VCDS are
the only other full members. Responsibility for the decisions and
advice that
emerge
rests solely with the CDS. More information on COS is set out
below.
106.
Mr Hoon told
the Inquiry that it was important that he, the CDS and the
PUS
“worked
together, otherwise we had problems”:
“… it was
important for me to enjoy the confidence of the military, but at
the same
time ensure
that those responsible for developing policy on the Civil Service
side
were
comfortable with where we were going.”71
107.
Mr Hoon added
that “one of the great successes” of the MOD was the extent
to
which it
was “genuinely joined up” and the “real integration between the
civil servants
67
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 76.
68
Ministry of
Defence, How Defence
Works – Defence Framework, December
2010, page 14.
69
Ministry of
Defence, The New
Operating Model: How Defence Works, April
2013, page 24.
70
Ministry of
Defence, How Defence
Works – Defence Framework, December
2010, page 29.
71
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 2.
284