9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
capability.92
It endorsed
the Committee’s opinion that the Iraqi Government in
Baghdad
should
maintain its interest in Basra and the wider region.
On border
security the Government response advised that the Government of
Iraq had
recently
pressed the Iranian Government to cut any links with armed groups
operating in
Iraq and to
do more to improve border security and fight terrorism. UK forces
were training
the Iraqi
Department of Border Enforcement in Maysan province, which was
providing a
visible
presence on known smuggling routes. The UK was encouraging Iraqi
responsibility
for
maritime security, including deterrence and disruption of piracy,
smuggling and terrorist
activity.
Iraqi forces were supported in this role by a significant coalition
presence, and
were
increasingly operating in collaboration with their Kuwaiti
partners.
128.
On 23 August,
Maj Gen Shirreff reported that:
“… the
redeployment of the Maysan Battlegroup is now complete and CAN
[Camp
Abu Naji],
the focus of so much fighting over the last three years, is now
closed and
handed over
to the IA [Iraqi Army]. This has been a demanding and
well‑executed
operation
and considerable credit is due to those involved. The final convoy
returns
to SLB
[Shaiba Logistics Base] on the evening of 24
August.”93
129.
Maj Gen
Shirreff reported that he had briefed Maj Gen Hamadi on
Op
SALAMANCA,
emphasising that “we are implementing the Basra Security plan
as
agreed by
Prime Minister Maliki rather than anything new or different”. Maj
Gen Hamadi
had “bought
in” to the plan.
130.
Lt Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry that he also had to get the approval of
the Iraqi
authorities
in Baghdad, which he described as “a very lengthy, rather tortuous
process”.94
Once this
approval was obtained, Gen Casey offered the UK a battalion
from his Corps
131.
Lt Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry that “the idea of American troops on the
streets of
Basra did
not go down particularly well in London”, and no US troops were
involved. The
US did,
however, provide some surveillance assets, and significant amounts
of funding –
by the end
of the operation US$80m had been spent.
92
Twelfth
Special Report from the House of Commons Defence Committee, Session
2005‑2006,
UK Operations
in Iraq: Government Response to the Committee’s Thirteenth Report
of Session 2005‑06,
HC
1603.
93
Minute
Shirreff, 23 August 2006, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 23
August 2006’.
94
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 17.
95
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 16.
27