3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
770.
The draft text
also included a new provision deciding that “notwithstanding”
the
finding in
OP1 that Iraq “remains” in material breach of its obligations under
relevant
resolutions,
Iraq would be afforded “a final opportunity to comply” with its
obligations.
771.
That
provision, which was designed to provide a ‘firebreak’ between the
finding
of material
breach in OP1 and the rest of the provisions in the resolution,
became, after
further
amendment, OP2 in resolution 1441.
772.
Intense
discussions on the precise wording of those and other provisions in
the
draft
resolution continued between capitals and in New York.
773.
A document
setting out “a further update of the compendium of proposals on
key
paragraphs”,
reflecting discussions over the preceding weekend, was circulated
with
an email
from Mr Pattison’s office on the morning of 4
November.259
That
included an
option for
alternative additional text in OP4 to the proposal in the 1
November draft
which
stated: “and will be reported to the Security Council for
assessment in accordance
with
OP12”.
774.
Mr Grainger
immediately sent Mr Pattison’s email of 4 November to
Mr Wood and
775.
A minute from
Mr Ricketts to Mr Straw’s Private Office on 5 November
reported
that the
French were concerned about the omission of a reference to OP11 –
as well
as to
OP12 – in OP4. That could be read as opening the door “further” to
a report to
the Council
from a Member State for assessment in accordance with
OP12.261
776.
Mr Ricketts’
advice was sent to Mr Grainger, amongst others.
777.
Lord Goldsmith
met Mr Wood and Mr Grainger on 5 November.
778.
A letter from
Mr Grainger to Mr Brummell later that day makes clear
that Lord
Goldsmith
asked for further information on the use and effect of the veto by
the
Permanent
Members of the Security Council.262
The letter
indicated that the discussion
centred on
the question of the legal effect of a veto of a resolution by a
Permanent
Member of
the Security Council.
779.
One of the
questions on which Lord Goldsmith had sought further information
was
whether it
would be possible to argue that a P5 veto had been cast on
unreasonable
grounds and
therefore would not prevent a resolution being adopted.
Mr Grainger’s clear
advice was
that there was nothing in the practice of the Council or in the UN
Charter to
support
that argument.
259
Email
PA/Mr Pattison to FCO officials, 4 November 2002, attaching
Paper ‘Iraq: UNSCR: UK, French
and
American proposals’.
260
Email
Grainger to Wood and Wilmshurst, 4 November 2002,
‘Iraq’.
261
Minute
Ricketts to Private Secretary [FCO], 5 November 2002, ‘Iraq: French
Reactions’.
262
Letter
Grainger to Brummell, 5 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Legal Effect of the
Veto’.
333