The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
military
presence in Iraq post-conflict mandated by the UN would no longer
be an
occupying
power regulated by the Hague and Geneva Conventions.”
215.
Mr Michael
Wood, the FCO Legal Adviser, sent a copy of Mr Grainger’s
paper
to Mr Straw
on 28 February.
216.
In
Parliament on 3 February, Mr Blair offered “absolute
assurances” that the
UK would
deal with any humanitarian consequences of conflict and undertook
to
“try to
ensure that we move in to help get Iraq back on its
feet”.
217.
Mr Mandelson
asked Mr Blair about preparations for recovery and
reconstruction
in the
House of Commons on 3 February:
“In
addition to the need for political transition, the humanitarian and
refugee
demands
could be immense. Will he outline to the House what preparation
is
being made
for that at the United Nations and by key members of the
international
community?
What structure for reconstruction is being put in place? In terms
of
donor
funding, will Britain join America – and, I think Switzerland and
Canada – in
making an
early offer of resources for those purposes?”106
“… we must
deal with those vital points. We are in discussion with allies and
the
United
Nations about reconstruction. The Foreign Secretary and I have
spoken
to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations about that. If there is a
conflict
and
Saddam’s regime is removed, it is important to give absolute
assurances
and
undertakings to the people of Iraq that we shall deal with any
humanitarian
consequences.
In such circumstances, we must also try to ensure that we
move
in to
help get Iraq back on its feet as quickly as possible. This country
is willing
to play
its part in that with others.”
219.
In answer to a
question from Mr Tony Baldry (Conservative) about the extent
of
discussions
taking place with UN agencies, Mr Blair replied that detailed
discussions
were under
way and that: “We are well aware that we must have a humanitarian
plan
that is
every bit as viable and well worked out as a military
plan.”107
220.
Sir
Christopher Meyer told the Inquiry:
“… the
worry at the time, was that there would be some kind of
humanitarian
disaster …
What just disappeared from the calculations was the understanding
that,
after
Saddam was toppled, you were going to have to maintain law and
order and
106
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2003, column 28.
107
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 3
February 2003, column 36.
348