The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
we have
known about the inadequacies of the IPS for so long and yet failed
to address
them”.257
The
Assessments Staff reinforced the lack of progress in reforming the
ISF.
740.
In October
2005, the Chiefs of Staff made a stark assessment of the
insurgency
and
coalition strategy in Iraq. They concluded that “Ministers needed
to be clear
that the
campaign could potentially be heading for ‘strategic failure’, with
grave
national
and international consequences if the appropriate actions were not
taken”.258
Gen Walker
judged that only 5 percent of UK military effort in MND(SE) was
devoted
to
counter‑insurgency operations. But neither Air Marshal
Sir Glenn Torpy, Commander
Joint
Operations, nor Gen Walker reassessed UK force requirements in
Iraq, based
on those
two assessments.
741.
The security
situation at this point should have resulted in a reassessment of
the
UK troop
levels needed to achieve the UK’s key outcomes in MND(SE). Although
the
responsibility
for tactical decision‑making rested with commanders on the ground,
it was
for
Gen Walker to ensure that those commanders had sufficient
resources to deliver.
742.
The absence of
additional resources placed further pressure on the UK’s
ability
to deliver
the conditions required for transfer. At the end of 2005 and in
early 2006
there were
further indications that the ISF were not ready to operate alone.
The MOD
reported to
the final DOP(I) meeting of 2005 that the capacity of the Iraqi
administration
and
security forces to assume responsibility, acknowledging the
challenge of increasing
sectarianism
and militia infiltration, was one of the key challenges
remaining.
743.
In March 2006,
the JIC again highlighted doubts about the ability of the Iraqi
Army
to operate
without MNF support and concerns about the corruption and
infiltration of
the IPS.
744.
US concerns
about UK plans for the transition of Maysan and Muthanna to
Iraqi
control in
May were such that Dr Reid adapted them to include a small
residual team
providing
mentoring and support to the Iraqi Army.
745.
Dr Reid
continued to press ahead with drawdown and announced that
troop
levels
would reduce in May 2006 from approximately 8,000 to around 7,200
based on
“completion
of various security sector reform tasks, a reduction in the support
levels for
those
tasks, and recent efficiency measures in theatre”.259
That
rationale did not include
an
assessment of the effect of those tasks on the capability of the
ISF.
257
Minute CGS
to CDS, 18 October 2005, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct
05’.
258
Minutes, 18
October 2005, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
259
Letter Reid
to Blair, 9 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Force Level Review and
Announcement’.
102