3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
172.
Mr Webb
recommended that the UK should acknowledge that the countries
posed
“increasing”
risks to international stability; and that the US should be
persuaded to
explain
why. The UK should:
“Encourage
a broad-based approach ranging from diplomacy to
challenge
inspections
and levers on suppliers.
“Not rule
out UK participation in military action against Iraq […] if that is
the only way
to stem the
tide of WMD proliferation and a worthwhile and legal option exists
at
the time.”
173.
Mr Webb also
stated that it was important to distinguish between two strands;
the
“direct
risks from proliferation” and the “potential association with
international terrorism”.
174.
Mr Webb’s
detailed advice on the risks posed by Iraq is addressed in Section
4.1.
175.
In the context
of the response from European partners, Mr Webb
advised:
“… it would
be wiser for the UK to take a more complex position supporting
the
underlying
concerns but advocating a greater mix of possible approaches.
No.10
have
started to take this line over the last week but we need to think
through the
options in
more depth. In this way we have better prospects of influencing the
US
towards a
successful outcome. Above all we should encourage the US to
explain
the issues
more effectively …”
176.
Mr Webb asked
Mr Hoon for approval for the overall approach he had set
out
on which he
would “be working with the Cabinet Office” before Mr Blair’s
meeting with
President
Bush in early April.
177.
Mr Ehrman, who
had been shown a draft of Mr Webb’s advice, raised a
number
of
questions and asked for a briefing for himself and Mr Patey on what
the MOD
considered
to be the “valid options for military operations in some specific
scenarios
178.
Mr Ehrman
underlined the potential legal difficulties, including differences
between
the UK and
the US on the question of whether a determination that Iraq was
flouting
UNSCRs
could be made without collective Security Council
authorisation.
179.
Mr Blair
agreed to a discussion of Iraq in Cabinet, which took place
on
7 March.
180.
Mr Blair told
Cabinet on 28 February that he would be talking to President
Bush
about the
next phase in the war against terrorism. The main decisions,
including on Iraq,
needed to
be properly thought through and were some way off. The Cabinet
should
discuss the
next phase when the Foreign Secretary returned.56
55
Letter
Ehrman to Webb, 27 February 2002, ‘Axis of Evil’.
56
Cabinet
Conclusions, 28 February 2002.
417