The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
904.
Referring to
the draft resolution tabled by the UK, US and France on 7
March,
Mr Blair
added:
“… we could
have asked for the second resolution then and there, because it
was
justified.
Instead, we laid down an ultimatum calling on Saddam to come into
line
with
resolution 1441, or be in material breach.”
905.
That was “not
an unreasonable proposition, but still countries hesitated”,
asking
how full
co-operation would be judged. The UK had “worked on a further
compromise”,
consulting
the inspectors to draw up “five tests, based on” the “clusters”
document.
The inspectors
had “added another test: that Saddam should publicly call on the
Iraqis
to
co-operate with them”. Saddam would have been given a specified
time to fulfil all six
tests to
show full co-operation. If he did so, “the inspectors could then
set out a forward
work
programme that would extend over a period of time to make sure that
disarmament
happened”.
If, however, Saddam had failed to meet the tests, “action would
follow”.
906.
Mr Blair
told the House of Commons that:
“Last
Monday [10 March], we were getting very close … We very nearly had
the
majority
agreement …
“… there
were debates about the length of the ultimatum, but the basic
construct
was
gathering support. Then … France said it would veto a second
resolution
whatever
the circumstances. Then France denounced the six tests. Later that
day,
Iraq
rejected them. Still we continued to negotiate …
“Last
Friday, France said it could not accept any resolution with an
ultimatum in
it. On
Monday [17 March], we made final efforts to secure agreement.
However,
the fact is
that France remains utterly opposed to anything which lays down
an
ultimatum
authorising action in the event of non-compliance by
Saddam.”
“Those on
the Security Council opposed to us say that they want Saddam to
disarm
but they
will not countenance any new resolution which authorises force in
the
event of
non-compliance. That is their position – no to any ultimatum and no
to any
resolution
that stipulates that failure to comply will lead to military
action. So we must
demand that
Saddam disarms, but relinquish any concept of a threat if he does
not.”
908.
Mr Blair
stated that Saddam Hussein had allowed the inspectors into Iraq
after four
years of
refusal because of:
“… the
threat of force … It is the imminence of force. The only persuasive
power to
which he
responds is 250,000 allied troops on his doorstep. However when
that fact
is so
obvious, we are told that any resolution that authorises force in
the event of
non-compliance
will be vetoed – not just opposed, but vetoed and
blocked.”
562