The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

• looked forward to the early meeting of the IAMB, which would include

representatives of the UN Secretary-General, the IMF, the Arab Fund for Social

and Economic Development, and the World Bank;

• noted that disbursements from the DFI would be “at the direction of the Authority,

in consultation with the interim Iraqi administration”;

• underlined that the DFI would be used “in a transparent manner to meet the

humanitarian needs of the Iraqi people, for the economic reconstruction and

repair of Iraq’s infrastructure, for the continued disarmament of Iraq, and for the

costs of Iraqi civilian administration, and for other purposes benefiting the people

of Iraq”;

• decided that all export sales of Iraqi petroleum, petroleum products and natural

gas should made “consistent with prevailing international market best practices”,

and that 95 percent of the revenue should be deposited into the DFI (with five

percent deposited into the UN Compensation Fund for victims of Saddam

Hussein’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait); and

• requested the UN Secretary-General to continue operation of the OFF

programme for up to six months from 22 May.148

286. Mr Straw told a meeting of Cabinet the same day that:

“This Security Council Resolution would put the Coalition’s work in Iraq on a firm

basis, including for oil sales.”149

287. Hard Lessons recorded that the resolution cleared the way for the resumption of

oil exports.150 The first sale was made on 22 June.

288. Sir Jon Cunliffe told the Inquiry that the UK’s position in the negotiations

over resolution 1483 had been informed by its concern to maintain legitimacy and

accountability as an Occupying Power:

“… there was great suspicion that … the war was designed to get hold of Iraqi

oil revenues and was being inspired by the US oil industry … we thought it was

very important for the perception in the international community that these [oil]

resources were controlled transparently and at arm’s length and in a proper way

we could account for them. We thought it would make a huge difference as to

whether we could get other countries to join us in the reconstruction effort … and

we also thought that it was important for the UK generally to ensure they were used

efficiently on the ground in Iraq.151

148 UN Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003).

149 Cabinet Conclusions, 22 May 2003.

150 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing Office,

2009.

151 Public hearing, 9 July 2010, page 38.

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