9.8 |
Conclusions: The post-conflict period
One clear
focus of UK strategy was the need to bring the Sunni community back
into
mainstream
Iraqi politics, often referred to as “reconciliation” or “Sunni
outreach”. Mr Blair
consistently
said that reconciliation was the key to success, and UK Ministers
regularly
lobbied
their US and Iraqi counterparts about its importance, and the added
security risk
if it
was neglected.
Reconciliation
was hampered from the start. The UK, understandably, had
limited
knowledge
of Iraq’s complex tribal landscape, and how it interacted with
broader
confessional
groups. Decisions about the scope and implementation of
de-Ba’athification
made in the
early days of the CPA had a lasting legacy of mistrust and
alienation.
The UK took
a number of steps to promote reconciliation, including Sir Nigel
Sheinwald’s
meetings
with hard-line Sunni nationalists and representatives of Sunni
insurgent groups
in November
2005 and February 2006, and work by Lieutenant General Graeme
Lamb
with
insurgent groups in late 2006 and early 2007. The UK also lobbied
for a unity
Government
in 2006, but ultimately in vain. Mr Dominic Asquith, British
Ambassador
to Iraq,
observed that: “For a government of national unity, most of its
members are
122.
US and UK
strategies for Iraq had in effect been on different courses since
the UK
decision to
focus its attention on MND(SE) in 2003. As a result of that
decision, the UK
had
acquired distinctly different priorities from the US. It was only
marginally involved in
the central
tasks of stabilising the Iraqi Government in Baghdad and managing
sectarian
divisions,
while it had come to see its main task in Basra as one of keeping
the situation
calm while
building the case for drawdown.
123.
For some time,
there had been indications of tension between the US
and
UK
regarding assessments of progress, and differing assumptions about
whether
plans were
needed for long-term bases in Iraq. In May 2006, Mr Blair was
told about
“rumblings
from the US system about UK failure to grip the security situation
in what they
regard as a
strategically vital part of Iraq”.37
Gen Jackson
felt compelled to report that:
“The
perception, right or wrong, in some – if not all – US military
circles is that the
UK is
motivated more by the short-term political gain of early withdrawal
than by the
long-term
importance of mission accomplishment; and that, as a result,
MND(SE)’s
operational
posture is too laissez faire and lacks initiative
…”38
36
Letter
Asquith to Sawers, 12 September 2006, ‘Iraq: First
Impressions’.
37
Minute
Phillipson to Prime Minister, 2 May 2006, ‘VTC with President Bush,
1615 2 May 2006’.
38
Minute CGS
to CDS, 22 May 2006, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 15-18 May
06’.
491