6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
get an
agreement from Turkey. That was the point at which we took the
decision … the
actual
decision didn’t come until I came back from
Turkey.”522
1361.
Mr Hoon
added that the US did not abandon hope of securing
Turkey’s
agreement
to the deployment of 4th Infantry Division until much later, and
that it had
stayed in
the eastern Mediterranean until after the start of the
invasion.523
1362.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry: “I went with Geoff Hoon to
Ankara … to … finally
see whether
we could achieve agreement with the Turks.”524
1363.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry:
“I felt
slightly embarrassed, to be absolutely honest, because having been
head
of chancery
in the Embassy in Ankara for three and a half years, I thought I
knew
my Turks. I
thought they were going to be supportive, and I of all people
should
have
realised that the idea of the Brits going into Kurdistan … re‑awoke
some very
sensitive
Turkish nationalist memories of how we behaved in the 1920s when
they
felt we
were flirting with the idea of a Kurdistan as part of a way of
dismantling the
Ottoman
empire.”
…
“So we
miscalculated there, and I have to say, I should have known better
myself.”525
“I think we
thought we could provide reassurances that would overcome the
Turkish
objections,
and unfortunately the Turks were reasonably polite and
accommodating
to let us
feel that might actually be the case.”526
1365.
Sir Kevin
confirmed that he was referring to both military and civilian
views:
“The
problem was also they had an election, and there was a certain
amount
of chaos in
Turkey about the stability of their arrangements, and I – we
were
encouraged
to think that even at the last moment there might be a vote which
would
enable us
to go there.”
1366.
In response to
a question about whether he recalled that the views of the
FCO
and the
Embassy in Ankara were not dissimilar from his own, Sir Kevin
told the Inquiry
that he did
not:
“… recall
being out on a personal limb … [M]y sense was that we were
getting
mixed
messages, and that we need to clarify the situation, not that we
were being
522
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, page 60.
523
Public
hearing, 19 January 2010, pages 60‑61.
524
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 15.
525
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, pages 15‑16.
526
Private
hearing, 6 May 2010, page 16.
375