6.4  |  Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001 to January 2003

1054.  Brigadier Whitley explained that, on 28 December, uncertainties about whether

Turkey would allow transit of ground forces had led US and UK planners urgently to

concentrate on developing robust operations from the south. Lt Gen McKiernan “would

welcome the commitment of a UK division in the South from the start of the operation”.

The UK mission would be to “seize, secure and control” the rear area and right flank

of the operation and provide a coherent transition to Phase IV operations in captured

territory without loss of US combat forces. That would include securing infrastructure

such as Umm Qasr and the Rumaylah oilfields, and fixing Iraqi forces in the Basra area.

The Area of Operations (AO) was likely to be bounded by the Iraq/Kuwait border, the

US V Corps/1 MEF (Marine Expeditionary Force) boundary, Jalibah airfield and the

Euphrates, a similar land area to Kuwait.

1055.  Brigadier Whitley strongly recommended acceptance, in principle, of “a UK Area

of Operations and mission in an area of southern Iraq bounded in the north by the

Euphrates”.

1056.  The Chiefs of Staff discussed the southern option on 6 January.506 Lt Gen Reith

described his latest paper on the land options, which was “based on a US offer for

the UK to operate at division strength … in a discrete AOR in the South”. That plan

“appeared to offer strategic influence to the UK, especially in the move to Phase IV”.

1057.  Mr Paul Johnston, Head of FCO Security Policy Department, reported to

Mr Straw’s Private Office that, at the Chiefs of Staff Committee, Sir Kevin Tebbit and

General Sir Michael Walker, Chief of the General Staff (CGS), both noted that the

southern option for the UK was “part of an overall concept significantly different to that

on which Ministers had so far been consulted”.507

1058.  In a paper on the southern option, dated 6 January and submitted after the

discussion, Lt Gen Reith advised that the risks to a UK division were “minimal”.508 The

“geographical area proposed would allow the UK to set the standard in the aftermath”

and meant that it would be “strategically placed to exert maximum influence during

Phase IV”. Lt Gen Reith described the US plan as based on four assumptions, including:

“The UK experience in wider peacekeeping, and subsequent ability to conduct early

Phase IV – post conflict – operations.”

1059.  Lt Gen Reith recommended the deployment of a divisional headquarters and

three brigades to the South; and that the armoured brigade should comprise four

battlegroups.

506  Minutes, 6 January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

507  Minute Johnston to Private Secretary [FCO], 6 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Chiefs of Staff Meeting, 6 January’.

508  Minute Reith to COSSEC, 6 January 2003, ‘Op TELIC – Southern Option’ attaching Paper ‘Op TELIC

Southern Option – Revised’.

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