9.2 | 23 May 2003 to June 2004

1127. The Occupation of Iraq formally came to an end on 28 June, two days earlier than

had been originally planned in order to avoid disruption by insurgents.

1128. Ambassador Bremer recorded that the idea for the early transfer reached him

through Dr Rice, who reported that “the President is interested in trying to ‘wrong foot’

the opposition”.642

1129. Power was transferred from the CPA and GC to the Iraqi Interim

Government (IIG).643

1130. The IIG comprised a President, two Vice Presidents, a Prime Minister, a Deputy

Prime Minister, and 31 ministers. Six of the 31 ministers were women.

1131. Sir David Richmond told the Inquiry that the representation of women was:

“… one of the minor success stories of the CPA … John Sawers and Jerry Bremer

when they were setting up the Iraqi Governing Council were very insistent there

should be women members. I think there were three at that stage. We said that the

Iraqi governing council had to choose the Ministers in that sort of first government

that was set up at the end of August-beginning of September 2003. There were

no women.

“So my conclusion was that left to their own devices I think there would have been

very few women involved in the process, but we learned from that lesson, and in

drafting the transitional administrative law, the TAL, which was in effect the interim

Constitution and the electoral process and representation in the assemblies and

so on, we insisted on a quota for women. There were also women in the interim

government we handed over to. Quite a lot of work was done by various people,

including some of the British secondees to try to set up women’s groups to

encourage their participation in the process.”644

1132. On 28 June, as he prepared to leave Baghdad, Mr Richmond sent a valedictory

telegram to the FCO in which he assessed the failures and achievements of the CPA.645

He judged that:

“The failure to crack down on the orgy of looting in April last year resulted in a crime

wave which the Coalition has never been able to bring fully under control.”

1133. Mr Richmond acknowledged that it could be argued the Coalition would have

faced a security challenge regardless of its actions, but observed:

642 Bremer LP III & McConnell M. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.

Threshold, 2006.

643 Bremer LP III & McConnell M. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.

Threshold, 2006. Note: Ambassador Bremer describes last-minute UK concerns about the early transfer

of power. There is no evidence on this point in the papers available to the Inquiry.

644 Public hearing, 26 January 2011, pages 50-51.

645 Telegram 359 IraqRep to FCO London, 28 June 2004, ‘Iraq: Valedictory: The End of Occupation’.

393