9.2  |  23 May 2003 to June 2004

243.  In their meeting, Mr Blair urged President Bush to focus on a media strategy

for communicating with the Iraqi people, to ensure they understood that the US and

UK were there to help and were improving basic services.119 Mr Blair observed that if

security could be improved, the pace of reconstruction could quicken.

244.  In mid-July, the CPA sent its ‘Vision for Iraq’, the strategic plan in anticipation of

which the UK had halted work on its own strategy in June, to Washington for approval.120

By 18 July, senior officials in the Pentagon had approved it.

245.  The ‘Vision’ defined the CPA’s ultimate goal as working to achieve:

“… a unified and stable, democratic Iraq that: provides effective and representative

government for the Iraqi people; is underpinned by new and protected freedoms for

all Iraqis and a growing market economy; is able to defend itself but no longer poses

a threat to its neighbours or international security.”121

246.  The highest priority was to create a secure and safe environment through recruiting

and training Iraqi police and armed forces. Hard Lessons describes its other goals as

promoting a rapid transition to a market economy, establishing an effective rule of law

system, and establishing programmes to develop democracy.122

247.  A plan for the implementation of the Vision, ‘Achieving the Vision to Restore Full

Sovereignty to the Iraqi People’,123 was circulated to members of Congress on 23 July.124

248.  The introduction to ‘Achieving the Vision’ by Ambassador Bremer said:

“This progressive plan is an overview of the strategy necessary for early

restoration of full sovereignty to the Iraqi people. The strategy is driven by more

detailed action plans (e.g. plans for the New Iraqi Army, the police, restoring

electrical power, etc.).”125

249.  In his memoir Sir Hilary Synnott, who became Head of CPA(South) in July

2003, recalled:

“I forced myself to sit down and try to read the Vision’s electronic manifestation …

If the Vision amounted to a goal, the Plan which accompanied it sought to make

119  Letter Rycroft to Adams, 18 July 2003, ‘Prime Minister’s Visit to Washington, 17 July’.

120  Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

121  Synnott H. Bad Days in Basra: My Turbulent Time as Britain’s Man in Southern Iraq. IB Tauris & Co

Ltd., 2008.

122  Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

123  Report Coalition Provisional Authority, 21 July 2003, ‘Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty

to the Iraqi People’.

124  Bremer LP III & McConnell M. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope.

Threshold, 2006.

125  Report Coalition Provisional Authority, 21 July 2003, ‘Achieving the Vision to Restore Full Sovereignty

to the Iraqi People’.

247