9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
88.
The two key
issues in relation to Iraq were what more could be done on
Sunni
outreach
and driving forward Iraqiisation in order to create the conditions
for
MNF transition.
89.
Also on 19
July, Mr Blair met Ambassador Negroponte, now the US Director
of
National Intelligence,
at No.10.44
Mr Negroponte
said that it was important to keep
the political
process moving forward, and to ensure that the ISF were not torn
apart
by sectarian
tensions.
90.
Mr Blair
agreed, and said that a “key part of our strategy had to be keeping
people’s
attention
properly focused”. Some commentators were beginning to suggest
that,
although
their tactics were unacceptable, the aims of terrorist groups were
legitimate.
91.
In a separate
conversation, Sir Nigel Sheinwald told Ambassador Negroponte
that
the UK
aimed to start handing over its provinces in Iraq by the end of the
year.
92.
DOP(I) met on
21 July, chaired by Mr Blair, and considered Dr Reid’s paper
on
operational
transition.45
93.
The Chairman’s
Brief, written by Cabinet Office officials for Mr Blair,
suggested
that he
would “want to focus the meeting on ensuring
individual Departments drive
forward work
over the summer”.46
As the
Committee would not meet again until after
the
Parliamentary recess, Mr Blair should “emphasise
that the UK effort must not
lose impetus
over the summer as the
preparations for key events in Iraq (Constitution,
elections,
and transition) will need to be well advanced.”
94.
DOP(I) agreed
Dr Reid’s recommendation that, subject to the continuation
of
current
trends in the capacity of the Iraqi security forces and to there
being no major
deterioration
in the security situation, the UK should plan to implement
transition to Iraqi
control in
two provinces of southern Iraq around October 2005, and in the
other two
95.
Mr Blair
emphasised the importance of avoiding giving the “erroneous
impression
that we
intended to leave whatever the circumstances” and gave the
instruction that no
further
written papers should be produced until there had been consultation
with the US
and the
Iraqi Government.
96.
The second
paper considered by DOP(I) on 21 July was written by the FCO
and
presented
by Mr Patey. It was entitled ‘Iraq: Splitting the Jihadists
from the National
44
Letter
Phillipson to Jeffrey, 19 July 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
John Negroponte, 19 July’.
45
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
46
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Prime Minister, 19 July 2005,
‘DOP(I) – Chairman’s Brief’.
47
Minutes, 21
July 2005, DOP(I) meeting; Paper Secretary of State for Defence, 18
July 2005,
‘Operational
Transition in Iraq’.
48
Paper FCO,
18 July 2005, ‘Iraq: Splitting the Jihadists from the National
Opposition’.
505