11.1 | De-Ba’athification

60. Ambassador Bremer wrote in his account of leading the CPA that he had recognised

from the outset that the de‑Ba’athification Order “wasn’t perfect, but contained a degree

of flexibility” in the provision that allowed for exemptions to the ban to be made on a

case‑by‑case basis.38 Both he and Ambassador Ryan Crocker, a US State Department

official seconded to the CPA, had agreed that this flexibility was “critical”.

61. Ambassador Bremer told the Inquiry that the Order was “narrowly drawn” so as to

affect only the top 1 percent of party members, and to deny them public sector positions

but not the ability to work in the private sector.39

62. On the same day that Order No.1 was issued, Mr Blair and President Bush spoke

on the telephone.40 The record of their conversation, taken by Mr Blair’s Assistant Private

Secretary, indicates that they did not discuss de‑Ba’athification.

Hard Lessons, an account of the US reconstruction experience in Iraq, characterised

Order No.1 as “conceived in Washington and promulgated with little Iraqi involvement”.41

Secretary Rumsfeld, in his memoir, observed:

“Though the policy later found few defenders at the top level of the administration,

de‑Ba’athification initially had broad support among the relevant departments and

agencies.”42

The policy was discussed by the NSC two weeks before the invasion and there were

“no objections from any of the principals present” although President Bush had questioned

who would carry out the vetting needed.

Sir Suma Chakrabarti, DFID Permanent Secretary from 2002 to 2007, told the Inquiry

that the de‑Ba’athification decision was one of a number on which his department had

not been consulted.43

Lord Jay, FCO Permanent Under Secretary from 2002 to 2006, described the

de‑Ba’athification decision as one example of “difficulties in relation to the United States”.44

Mr Blair told the Inquiry:

“You know, there’s a lot of debate about de‑Ba’athification and so on … but he

[Bremer] was someone who knew his own mind, but I have to say I did not get the

impression he was refusing to discuss it with the British. On the contrary, we had Brits

working alongside in very senior positions.”45

38 Bremer LP III & McConnell M. My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Threshold, 2006.

39 Statement Bremer, 18 May 2010, page 3.

40 Letter Cannon to MacDonald, 16 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with Bush, 16 May’.

41 Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing

Office, 2009.

42 Rumsfeld D. Known and Unknown: A Memoir. Sentinel, 2011.

43 Public hearing, 8 December 2009, page 64.

44 Public hearing, 30 June 2010, page 41.

45 Public hearing, 21 January 2011, page 144.

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